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Abstract
This thesis is built with two essays on payments for ecosystem services under
different objectives. The purpose of the first essay is identifying optimal spatial targets
for PES under the multiple objectives of maximizing cost efficiency of ecological
benefits, represented by per unit cost of the ecological benefit, and maximizing economic
impacts, represented by gross domestic product (GDP). A further purpose is to evaluate
the tradeoff between the two objectives. In our case study, the two objectives of a PES
program are to maximize the cost efficiency of forest carbon storage and to maximize the
program’s economic impacts. Multi-objective linear programming (MOLP), an
optimization tool, was chosen to incorporate these objectives as targeting criteria. Results
identifying targeted counties with optimal PES distributions will help conservation
agencies anticipate regional (i.e., county-level) budget allocations dependent on the
relative importance placed on the two objectives. Similarly, projections of regional forest
carbon storage and economic impacts from the optimal distributions of payments will
help conservation agencies anticipate regional heterogeneity in forest carbon storage and
economic impacts and access their tradeoffs.
The second essay is for identifying spatial targets that optimally allocate a given
budget to achieve the multiple objectives of improving cost efficiency and promoting
equity and economic development. We evaluate trade-off and synergistic relationships
among the three objectives. Our results will help conservation agencies understand how
optimal spatial targeting and optimal budget allocations change with different weighting
schemes. Specifically, conservation agencies can optimally target and allocate budgets to
counties based on their preferences among the different weighting scenarios with regard
iv

to the trade-offs and synergies among the objectives of improving the cost efficiency of
carbon storage, decreasing poverty, and increasing economic impact of PES. The case
study area in our two essay covers the part of Central and Southern Appalachian Region
of the United States.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1

The global temperature, on average, increased between 0.6 and 0.9 degrees
Celsius over the 1906-2005 period. The rate of increase almost doubled during the last
half decade of that period (IPCC 2007). Recent climate change has triggered extensive,
negative effects on natural and human systems, including loss and damage to ecosystems
and environmental resources (IPCC 2014). Carbon dioxide that comprises the majority of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is one of the major contributing factors to the
observed increase in global temperatures since the mid-20th century (IPCC 2014; Garnett
2008). As global concern mounts around the issue of climate change, increasing and
sustaining forest-based carbon sequestration has proven to be a cost-effective way of
mitigating atmospheric carbon (Dwyer et al. 1992)
Despite the vital role of carbon sequestration in mitigating climate change, most
forestland owners receive no compensation for their contributions to this service.
Incentive payments to forest landowners can internalize the positive externality of carbon
sequestration (Engel et al. 2008; Wünscher et al. 2008; Farley and Costanza 2010).
Payment systems for ecosystem services (PES), like forest-based carbon sequestration,
have received considerable attention recently as a policy tool to internalize the value of
ecosystem services into land-use decision making (Engel et al. 2008; Farley and Costanza
2010)
The use of PES is often viewed as a means to achieve conservation goals while
promoting social equity and rural economic development (Bremer et al. 2014). However,
the potential inclusion of forest carbon in the U.S. carbon market program is
controversial, due in no small part to uncomfortably high levels of uncertainty in terms of
cost efficiency and potential economic impacts of payments for ecosystem services
2

(PES). Specifically, asymmetric information with regard to opportunity costs makes it
difficult to structure payments capable of differentiating between lands that differ in
terms of carbon sequestration opportunity costs and/or landowner willingness-to-accept
(WTA) payment to either afforest or refrain from deforesting their land. Likewise,
relevant social welfare analyses raise questions about the positive economic impacts of
PES since the mechanism involves the government taking wealth away from taxpayers
and redistributing it to forest landowners, creating the potential for deadweight loss (Wu
and Babcock 1995).
Therefore, there are several studies addressing cost efficiency emphasizes the
integration of costs and benefits in PES targeting criteria (Barton et al. 2003; Ferraro
2004; Claassen et al. 2008) and finding that low-income rural households and
communities can potentially benefit from PES programs, but program success depends on
factors such as local conditions, the distribution of land and land quality, economic
accounting of ecosystem services, and the use of appropriate spatial targeting (Pagiola et
al. 2005; Zilberman et al. 2008; Hyberg et al. 1991; Grêt-Regamey and Kytzia 2007;
Milder et al. 2010). Also, the studies focusing on the balance among cost efficiency,
social equity, and rural economic development has evolved to help design PES that
achieve conservation goals while promoting social equity and rural economic
development.
In response to issue around PES, the first essay focuses on identifying optimal
spatial targets for PES under the multiple objectives of maximizing cost efficiency of
ecological benefits, represented by per unit cost of ecological benefit, and maximizing
economic impacts, represented by gross domestic product (GDP). A further purpose is to
3

evaluate the tradeoff between the two objectives. Along the same line with the first essay,
the second essay is dealing with identifying spatial targets that optimally allocate a given
budget to achieve the multiple objectives of improving cost efficiency and promoting
equity and economic development. Then, we evaluate trade-off and synergistic
relationships among the three objectives. With the result from two essays will help
conservation agency anticipate budget allocations dependent on the relative importance
placed on the two several objectives.
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Chapter 2: Targeting payments for ecosystem services given ecological and
economic objective
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Abstract
We identify optimal spatial targets for payments for ecosystem services (PES)
under the multiple objectives of maximizing forest carbon storage cost efficiency and
maximizing economic impacts. A further purpose is to evaluate the tradeoff between the
two objectives. These objectives are used as targeting criteria in our case study of the
Central and Southern Appalachian Region of the United States, a heavily forested, lowincome region that could benefit from the economic impacts from PES. The concave
shaped Pareto optimal frontiers provide evidence that the increase in economic impacts is
relatively higher than the sacrifice in forest carbon benefits when the initial weight
assigned to economic impacts is relatively lower than the initial weight assigned to forest
carbon benefits and vice versa. Our projections of county-level forest carbon storage and
economic impacts help conservation agencies anticipate regional heterogeneity in forest
carbon storage and economic impacts and access their tradeoffs.
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1.

Introduction

1.1.

Background and objective
The global temperature, on average, increased between 0.6 and 0.9 degrees

Celsius over the 1906-2005 period. The rate of increase almost doubled during the last
half decade of that period (IPCC 2007). Recent climate change has triggered extensive,
negative effects on natural and human systems, including loss and damage to ecosystems
and environmental resources (IPCC 2014). Carbon dioxide that comprises the majority of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is one of the major contributing factors to the
observed increase in global temperatures since the mid-20th century (Garnett 2008; IPCC
2014). In response, worldwide attempts to mitigate atmospheric carbon emissions have
been made (Dodman 2009). Among those efforts, considerable attention has focused on
promoting forest carbon sequestration to offset carbon emissions by reducing
deforestation and increasing afforestation (Wittman and Caron 2009; Latta et al. 2011;
Cho et al. 2017). These efforts are important, because global forestland has the capacity
to sequester 2.4 ± 0.4 peta-grams of carbon emissions annually, which is equivalent to
30% of global carbon emissions from fossil fuels used in 2008 (Le Quéré et al. 2009; Pan
et al. 2011).
Despite the vital role of carbon sequestration in mitigating climate change, most
forestland owners receive no compensation for their contributions to this service.
Incentive payments to forest landowners can internalize the positive externality of carbon
sequestration (Engel et al. 2008; Wünscher et al. 2008; Farley and Costanza 2010) while
providing potential economic impacts to rural communities (Miranda et al. 2003; Corbera
et al. 2009; Li et al. 2011). The proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act would
10

have included a cap-and-trade program to generate payments for forest landowners for
the carbon sequestered in their forests (USDS 2010). That said, the potential inclusion of
forest carbon in the U.S. carbon market program is controversial, due in no small part to
uncomfortably high levels of uncertainty in terms of cost efficiency and potential
economic impacts of payments for ecosystem services (PES). Specifically, asymmetric
information with regard to opportunity costs makes it difficult to structure payments
capable of differentiating between lands that differ in terms of carbon sequestration
opportunity costs and/or landowner willingness-to-accept (WTA) payment to either
afforest or refrain from deforesting their land. Likewise, relevant social welfare analyses
raise questions about the positive economic impacts of PES since the mechanism
involves the government taking wealth away from taxpayers and redistributing it to forest
landowners, creating the potential for deadweight loss (Wu and Babcock 1995).
Two branches of literature on PES have been developed to address these
difficulties: one dealing with PES cost efficiency and the other dealing with the economic
impacts of PES programs. The literature addressing cost efficiency emphasizes the
integration of costs and benefits in PES targeting criteria (Barton et al. 2003; Ferraro
2004; Claassen et al. 2008). The other branch of literature finds that low-income rural
households and communities can potentially benefit from PES programs, but program
success depends on factors such as local conditions, the distribution of land and land
quality, economic accounting of ecosystem services, and the use of appropriate spatial
targeting (Hyberg et al. 1991; Pagiola et al. 2005; Grêt-Regamey and Kytzia 2007;
Zilberman et al. 2008; Milder et al. 2010).
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Despite the important role of cost efficiency in achieving given levels of
ecological benefits and the need to receive positive economic impacts from successfully
developed PES programs, few, if any, studies integrate these objectives into PES
targeting criteria. This gap in the literature is surprising given that (1) PES often serve
multiple objectives, including the promotion of efficient conservation and positive
economic impacts (Bulte et al. 2008; McShane et al. 2011; Sims et al. 2014) and (2) an
understanding of the tradeoffs between these objectives is important for successful PES
design (Wu and Yu 2017).
The purpose of this research is to fill a gap in the literature by identifying optimal
spatial targets for PES under the multiple objectives of maximizing cost efficiency of
ecological benefits, represented by per unit cost of ecological benefit, and maximizing
economic impacts, represented by gross domestic product (GDP). A further purpose is to
evaluate the tradeoff between the two objectives. In our case study, the two objectives of
a PES program are to maximize the cost efficiency of forest carbon storage and to
maximize the program’s economic impacts. Multi-objective linear programming
(MOLP), an optimization tool (Savir 1966), was chosen to incorporate these objectives as
targeting criteria in our case study of the Central and Southern Appalachian Region of the
United States (see Figure 2.1.).
The study area is a significant carbon sink accounting for around 20% of the
forested area in the U.S. and is also in need of an economic stimulus since it is one of the
most concentrated areas of poverty in the U.S. (Smith et al. 2009; Carl Vinson Institute of
Government 2002). Recent, continental-scale carbon budget analyses based on multiple
scaling approaches suggest that the region is becoming increasingly important as a
12

significant carbon sink (Hayes et al. 2012). Further, the average poverty rate of the region
was around 24% from 1960-2000, while the national average during the same period was
around 14% (Deaton and Niman 2012)
Through MOLP, we identify optimal county-level targets with a total
conservation budget optimally distributed under 27 alternatives, nine weighting scenarios
involving the two core objectives multiplied by three budget scenarios, and identify
resulting changes in forest carbon and estimate economic impacts. We then develop three
tradeoff frontiers between the two objectives that are created from the targeted PES for
the three budget scenarios. Along each frontier, PES is Pareto optimal since forest carbon
storage cannot be increased without sacrificing economic impacts and vice versa.
Results identifying targeted countie s with optimal PES distributions will help
conservation agencies anticipate regional (i.e., county-level) budget allocations dependent
on the relative importance placed on the two objectives. Similarly, projections of regional
forest carbon storage and economic impacts from the optimal distributions of payments
will help conservation agencies anticipate regional heterogeneity in forest carbon storage
and economic impacts and access their tradeoffs. The regional heterogeneity in the
anticipated effects of the benefits and their tradeoffs can serve as an empirically-informed
knowledge base for conservation agencies to use in evaluating forest-based carbon
incentive payment programs that balance the objectives of providing forest carbon
storage and economic impacts.

13

1.2.

Literature review
In literature concerned with targeting criteria for conservation programs, benefits,

costs, and benefit-cost ratios are used as targeting criteria (Babcock et al. 1997). In the
benefit-targeting approach, high-benefit target areas are identified based on differences in
the benefits between protected and unprotected lands (Scott et al. 1993; Wright et al.
1994; Powell et al. 2000; Rodrigues et al. 2003). Under this targeting approach, the costs
of establishing protected areas are implicitly assumed to be equal. In reality, substantial
cost variation exists between potential protected areas, suggesting the need to integrate
establishment costs and benefits when selecting areas to target for protection (Ando et al.
1998; Balmford et al. 2000; Polasky et al. 2001; Ferraro 2003; Moore et al. 2004).
A branch of literature focuses on whether the correlation between costs and
benefits has implications for the cost efficiency of protection. Babcock et al. (1997)
analyzed how the joint spatial distribution of costs and benefits influences the cost
efficiency of different targeting rules. Ferraro (2003) examined the correlation between
benefit ranking and cost ranking to identify conditions under which the integration of cost
and benefit information is likely important for effective decision making. Chomitz et al.
(2006) evaluated cost-targeting criteria by examining the effect of correlation between
costs and biodiversity for a targeting rule that includes a low-cost solution. Ando et al.
(1998) examined the effect of heterogeneous costs and corresponding biodiversity on
efficient conservation. Polasky et al. (2001) investigated the relation between a
conservation budget and biological reserves and concluded that an integrated analysis of
biological costs and benefits is needed to make effective conservation decisions.
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A large set of literature focuses on improving the cost efficiency of PES through
the cost-benefit relationship (Antle et al. 2003; Barton et al. 2003; Ferraro 2004;
Lubowski et al. 2006; Claassen et al. 2008; Engel et al. 2008; Gibbons et al. 2011; Lewis
et al. 2011; Mason and Plantinga 2011; Armsworth et al. 2012; Hanley et al. 2012;
Polasky et al. 2014). The literature suggests that increases in cost efficiency are achieved
when more finely resolved spatial variations in costs and benefits are used to allocate
PES contracts and set payment rates (Babcock et al. 1996; Antle et al. 2003; Zhao et al.
2003; Mason and Plantinga 2011; Armsworth et al. 2012). Recent literature suggests that
contract length and timing have clear implications for the cost efficiency of PES and
other conservation programs (Ando and Chen 2011; Lennox and Armsworth 2011;
Curran et al. 2016; Schöttker et al. 2016; Drechsler et al. 2017).
In addition, PES programs have become a flagship approach for conservation
organizations to advance rural economic development and reduce poverty (Zilberman et
al. 2008). The financial transfers of PES allow landowners to internalize the positive
externalities associated with ecosystem services (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005) and, thus, PES
programs are a potential tool for generating positive regional economic impacts for
participating landowners (Engel et al. 2008; Zilberman et al. 2008; Zhang and Pagiola
2011). Developing countries have begun to incorporate PES into rural economic
development programs (Muradian et al. 2010), and the literature has started to focus on
understanding the economic impacts of PES (Engel et al. 2008; Zilberman et al. 2008;
Zhang and Pagiola 2011). Findings in the literature include the following: 1) PES can be
vital for poverty reduction and rural economic development if designed to fit local
conditions (Pagiola et al. 2005), 2) the spatial distribution of land and land quality are
15

essential in determining poverty impacts (Zilberman et al. 2008), 3) the economic
impacts of PES depend on how effectively the program reaches the targeted beneficiaries
(Hyberg et al. 1991; Milder et al. 2010), 4) and the date when the program starts is crucial
for successful impacts on economic development and poverty reduction (Randrianarison
et al. 2017).
Few studies consider the economic impacts of PES when using the cost efficiency
of ecological benefits as the targeting criterion (Pagiola et al. 2005; Milder et al. 2010;
Ingram et al. 2014). When estimating the economic impacts of PES, the cost efficiency of
ecological benefits is typically ignored. In contrast, a few studies examined the tradeoffs
between cost efficiency and distributional equity in analyzing the performance of PES
(Alix-Garcia et al. 2003; Wu and Yu 2017). A major challenge in developing a
framework that considers both criteria in the spatial targeting of PES involves estimating
the values of ecological and economic impacts for given payment distributions.
Specifically, since payment distributions are critical elements for multi-objective
optimization, simultaneously maximizing both ecological and economic impacts is
difficult.

2.

Method
In our case study, we employ a framework that estimates forest carbon storage

and economic impacts using optimal payment distributions for multiple scenarios with
different weights between the two objectives. First, we estimate potential maximum
forest carbon benefits available for each county in response to alternative PES. This
potential carbon benefit is found by estimating the opportunity cost of sequestering forest
16

carbon using a land-use model that links forest-based carbon payments to forestland
change. We then convert forestland changes to forest carbon storage through a carbon
simulation model. The maximum county-level economic impacts, represented by GDP,
for given payment amounts are estimated using Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN)
via analyzing the interdependence of 536 industries based on the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) throughout the regional economies (AIM-AG
2017). The estimates acquired from the land-use, carbon simulation, and IMPLAN
models become inputs for the MOLP model to identify a set of optimal target counties
with an optimal budget distribution given different weights between the two objectives
and total PES budgets. The results from the integrated empirical framework are used to
develop their Pareto optimal frontiers.

2.1.

Land-use model
We adopt the conceptual framework developed in earlier works (Capozza and

Helsley 1989; Parks and Murray 1994; Barbier and Burgess 1997; Mauldin et al. 1999;
Plantinga et al. 1999; Lubowski et al. 2006; Lubowski et al. 2008) to specify a land use
model. The model assumes a risk-neutral, utility-maximizing, price-taking landowner
who maximizes expected net-present return from the decision to convert forestland to an
alternative use or retain forestland for a given time period. Under this conceptual
framework, land is retained as forest as long as the discounted marginal net benefit from
forestland exceeds the discounted marginal net benefit from competing land uses. Given
the conceptual framework, retaining forestland, given a time period, is expected to

17

increase as the discounted marginal net benefit from forestland relative to the discounted
marginal net benefit from competing land uses increases.
In our study, we hypothesize that forested area at the end of a period relative to
forested area at the beginning of the period is a function of annual forest return relative to
annual returns from competing land uses (i.e., crop, pasture, and urban) at the beginning
of the period. To test the hypothesis, we estimate the following semi-log model at the
county level:
log �

𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡

𝑝𝑝

� = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀

(1)

where 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 and 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛 are, respectively, forested areas in the first and last years of two five𝑝𝑝

year periods (i.e., 2001-2006 and 2006-2011); 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢 are the first year’s forest returns

relative to the returns from crop, pasture, and urban land uses, respectively, estimated by

subtracting returns from competing land uses from forest return; 𝑋𝑋 includes other factors

that affect

𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡

(referred to as “ratio of forested area”); 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 , 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 , 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢 , and 𝛿𝛿 are

corresponding parameters; and 𝜀𝜀 is an error term. County-average slope and elevation are
included in 𝑋𝑋 to control for the effects of topographical characteristics. The time-period

dummy variable (i.e., 1 for observation in 2001-2006 and 0 otherwise) is included in 𝑋𝑋 to

capture temporal differences in the ratios of forested area that are not captured by the

difference in relative returns across time. Ecoregion dummy variables and state dummy
variables are included in 𝑋𝑋 to capture regional fixed effects, such as differences in land-

use change patterns and land-use policies across ecoregions and states.

Forested areas at the county level are estimated by aggregating 30-m resolution
land cover data from National Land Cover Database (NLCD 2011). The annual forest
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return at the county level is estimated based on Faustmann’s model (1849) using harvest
volume data from the Forest Inventory and Analysis database (USDA Forest Service
2017) and stumpage price data from Timber Mart-South (2006, 2011). The annual return
of cropland is estimated based on county-level net cash farm income from cropland and
areas of harvest cropland from USDA Census of Agriculture (2012) and National
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS 2014). The annual return from pastureland is
estimated using county-level pastureland rent, county-level cattle numbers, and countylevel pastureland area from National Agricultural Statistics Service (2014) and USDA
Census of Agriculture (2012). The annual return from urban land is estimated based on
parcel-level data for assessed land value and total assessed value from the tax assessors’
offices of 25 counties and census-block group data for median housing price (U.S.
Census Bureau 2000; American Community Survey 2009, 2012). See S.1.of the online
supplementary material or Cho et al. (2017) for a detailed description of how the four net
returns are calculated. The Zonal Statistics tool in ArcGIS 10.1 (ESRI 2012) and a Digital
Elevation Model (DEM) (U.S. Geological Survey 2013) are used to estimate countyaverage slope and elevation. See Table 2.1. for a detailed description of the variables.
Once the land-use model in equation (1) was estimated, we calculated the
marginal effects of forest return relative to returns from competing land uses (i.e., crop,
pasture, and urban) on the ratio of forested area for each period. Only the marginal effect
of the forest return relative to the return from urban use was significant at the 5% level
(hereafter referred to as “significant”) in our land-use model, and thus we simulated
changes in the ratio of forested area by incrementally increasing forest return relative to
urban return, holding urban return constant. This simulation implies that all forestland
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owners receive the same payment amount if they are in the same county and that
payments made at the county level are to discourage deforestation for urbanization.
The simulation is implemented under the assumption that the bid amount by
conservation agencies converges to equilibrium, where the bid equals landowners’
opportunity costs of providing forest-based carbon storage. As a result, asymmetric
information in opportunity costs between landowners and conservation agencies seeking
to purchase the ecosystem services is overcome (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der
Hamsvoort 1997; Stoneham et al. 2003; Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 2007). We make
such an assumption since a portion of landowners may end up receiving payments
equaling more than their opportunity costs, should overbidding be allowed without
resolving the asymmetry (Ferraro 2008; Persson and Alpízar 2013)
.
2.2.

Carbon simulation model
The Terrestrial Ecosystem Model (TEM) is used to estimate changes in carbon

storage corresponding to changes in the ratio of forested area for each period based on
climate, forest type, disturbance and management histories, and other environmental
characteristics (Hayes et al. 2011). The TEM enables us to simulate cohort-level monthly
carbon fluxes for a period for each of the four land-use categories (crop, pasture, urban,
and forest). The simulated carbon fluxes are used to estimate carbon storage in forestland
and urban land. The estimated changes in carbon storage at the cohort level, based on the
area of each contiguous vegetation type, are used to aggregate changes in carbon storage
to the county level. For each period, this is done by simulating changes in the ratio of
forested area as forest return is incrementally increased relative to return from urban use.
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2.3.

Impact analysis for planning
IMPLAN (Version 3.0) utilizes a National Trade Flows Model (NTFM) (doubly-

constrained gravity model) to estimate a new set of regional purchase coefficients and
trade data to estimate local purchases based on a region’s characteristics (Lindall et al.
2006). IMPLAN output includes descriptive measures of the economy including total
industry output (a measure of economic activity), employment, labor income, and total
value-added or gross domestic product (GDP). Total industry output is defined as the
value of production by industry per year or a measure of overall economic activity by the
industry. Employment represents total wage and salary employees, as well as selfemployed jobs in a region, for both full-time and part-time workers. Labor income is
defined as employee compensation, including benefits, and proprietary (owner-operator)
income. Total value added, or GDP is defined as all income to workers paid by
employers; self-employed income; interests; rents, royalties, dividends, and profit
payments; and excise and sales taxes paid by individuals to businesses. Not only does the
model describe a regional economy, it can be used for predictive purposes by providing
multiplier-based estimates. From the economic impact indicators generated by IMPLAN,
GDP was selected to represent economic impacts for our study. It is considered the most
proper instrument for estimating regional overall economic impact (Weisbrod and
Weisbrod 1997).
Multipliers measure the response of the economy to a change in production or
demand. Multiplier analysis generally focuses on the impacts of exogenous changes on:
a) output of the sectors in the economy, b) income earned by households because of new
outputs, and c) employment (in physical terms) that is expected to be generated because
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of the new outputs. The concept of multipliers rests on the difference between the initial
impact of an exogenous change (final demand) and the total impacts of a change. Direct
impacts measure the response of a given industry given a change in final demand for that
same industry. Indirect impacts represent the response by all local industries that occur as
a result of a change in final demand for a specific industry. Induced impacts represent the
response by all local industries caused by increased (or decreased) expenditures of new
household income and inter-institutional transfers generated (or loss) from the direct and
indirect impacts of the change in final demand for a specific industry. Direct, indirect and
induced impact were integrated as economic impact in our model
We used Type SAM (Social Accounting Matrix) multipliers in our model. Type
SAM multipliers are used to estimate induced impacts and are calculated as (direct +
indirect + induced impacts)/direct impacts. The Type SAM multipliers take into account
the expenditures resulting from increased incomes of households from payment as well as
inter-institutional transfers resulting from economic activity. Therefore, Type SAM
multipliers assume that as final demand changes, incomes also increase along with interinstitutional transfers. As consumers and institutions increase expenditures, this leads to
increased demands for local industries.

2.4.

Multi-objective linear programming
The multiple objectives of maximizing both forest carbon benefits and economic

impacts triggered by payments are the targeting criteria we use in MOLP. Following
Ragsdale (2014), the MINIMAX method, which searches for optimal solutions with
minimal deviation from the target value for each objective, is utilized to determine
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optimal target counties in two steps. The first step determines the optimal objective
values of each individual objective, i.e. maximum forest carbon storage 𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐 and maximum
economic impacts 𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒 as:

𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
( ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ) subject to ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝐵𝐵,
𝑐𝑐
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖

𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
( ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 ) subject to ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 ≤ 𝐵𝐵,
𝑒𝑒

(2)

𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖

where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 are total forest carbon storage and total economic impact for county i; 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐

and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 are the optimal decision variables (continuous numbers between 0 as the lower

bound and 1 as the upper bound) representing the share for county i that is optimal for the
respective objectives; 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the total payment that is needed to obtain the total forest
carbon storage at county i; and B is the government’s budget for one of three budget

scenarios (i.e., 75%, 50%, and 25% of budget needed to reach maximum carbon storage
capacity).
Using the optimal values of the two individual objectives from the first step, the
second set of optimal decision variables 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 (continuous numbers between 0 as the lower

bound and 1 as the upper bound) for county i that minimizes the largest weighted

deviation from the optimal values of the two objectives (𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐 and 𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒 ), with two constraints
simultaneously is estimated as:
Min Q
subject to
1

𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 ∗ (𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐 − ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) ∗ 𝑂𝑂 ≤ Q
𝑐𝑐

1

𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 ∗ (𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒 − ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) ∗ 𝑂𝑂 ≤ Q
𝑒𝑒
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(3)

where 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 , is a hypothetical weight for forest carbon storage and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 is a hypothetical

weight associated with economic impact. Nine weight combinations between the two
objectives (i.e., 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 -100% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 -0%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 -87.5% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 -12.5%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 -75% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 -25%,

𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 -62.5% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 -37.5%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 -50% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 -50%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 -37.5% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 -62.5%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 -25% and

𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 -75%, 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 -12.5% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 -87.5%, and 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 -0% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 -100%) are used to reflect relative

importance between the two objectives. Once the optimal decision variable 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is obtained,
it is considered as the proportion of area that is included in PES from the maximum
candidate area in the county i. The budget allocated to the county i is estimated by
multiplying the proportion of the county, the optimal decision variable 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , by maximum

payment 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 . To solve the MOLP, the fminimax function in Matlab (MathWorks 2017) is
used with necessary modification of the code.

3.

Empirical results and discussion
Table 2.2. reports coefficients and corresponding standard errors for the semi-log

model in equation (1). The goodness of fit of the model is reflected in an adjusted R2 of
0.174, suggesting that the explanatory variables explain 17.4% of the variation of the
ratio of forested area. The F-statistic value is equal to 8.12 and statistically significant at
the 5% level, suggesting that overall estimation of the model is significant.
Forest return relative to urban return is positive and significant, while the other
two relative returns are insignificant. Thus, the results suggest that forest return affects
the ratio of forested area only if it is valued relative to urban return. Specifically, an
increase of $1/hectare/year in forest return relative to urban return in the first year
increases the average ratio of forested area by 0.0006% during the two periods. This
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finding suggests that incentive payments to boost forest return work towards sustaining
and/or increasing forestland only if the competing land use is urban development, not
crop or pasture management.
The dummy variables associated with the Cumberlands & Southern Ridge and
Valley Ecoregion and the 2001-2006 time period are significant while state dummy
variables are not significant. The signs of the coefficients imply that (1) the ratio of
forested area decreases more in the Cumberlands & Southern Ridge and Valley
Ecoregion than in the Southern Blue Ridge Ecoregion on average, (2) the ratio of forested
area decreases more during the 2006-2011 period relative to the 2001-2006 period on
average, and (3) the change of the ratio of forest area is not significantly affected by state
boundaries. These two findings suggest that loss of forestland differs across ecoregions
and time.
Figure 2.2. illustrates simulated forested area for the entire study area that would
have been discouraged from urban development at different values of forest return
relative to urban return. The simulated prevention of deforested area increases at a
decreasing rate until it reaches 60,216 hectares with a budget of $1,541,578 (Figure 2.2.).
The spatial distribution of the maximum allocated budget across counties is shown in
Figure 2.3. This figure illustrates how the payment budget would have been allocated if
its distribution were based on how much forested area would have been discouraged from
urban development without the optimal spatial targeting of payments.
Figure 2.4. illustrates the spatial distribution of carbon-cost efficiency across
counties. The distribution ranges from 0.01 tonne/$ to 1.97 tonne/$ when the payment
budget is not constrained. Carbon-cost efficiency is higher at the border area between
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West Virginia and Virginia, southwest Pennsylvania, southwest North Carolina, and the
southern tip of Appalachia in Alabama. Counties in the highest carbon-cost efficiency
range (0.68–1.97 tonne/$) tend to have (1) higher carbon storage gains from preventing
deforestation (1.85 tonne/hectare higher than the average carbon storage gain of 4.26
tonne/hectare for the entire study area) and (2) relatively lower opportunity costs of
preventing deforestation ($86.35/hectare lower than the average opportunity cost of
$93.03/hectare).
Figure 2.5. illustrates the spatial distribution across counties of economic-cost
efficiency (total county value added divided by the county’s maximum allocated budget).
Economic-cost efficiency is higher in a cluster of counties in Pennsylvania and in other
counties dispersed within the rest of the study area. The counties in the highest economiccost efficiency range ($1.75–$2.00) tend to have higher regional purchase coefficients,
the proportion of each dollar of local demand for a given commodity that is purchased
from local producers (IMPLAN Group LLC 2017).
Table 2.3. shows total carbon storage, gross domestic product, carbon-cost
efficiency, and economic-cost efficiency for the nine objective weighting scenarios
calculated for each budget scenario. On average, economic-cost efficiency is higher when
more weight is placed on maximizing economic impacts compared to maximizing
carbon-cost efficiency, while carbon-cost efficiency is higher when more weight is
assigned to maximizing carbon-cost efficiency. Figure 2.6. illustrates the payment budget
distribution among counties for the nine weighting scenarios when the annual-payment
budget is 50% of the budget required to achieve maximum carbon storage capacity. This
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budget constraint is used in Figure 2.6. since the budget level has little effect on the
overall pattern of the weighted distributions.
The maps in Figure 2.6. can be characterized by three points. First, the greater the
weight assigned to maximizing forest carbon storage relative to maximizing economic
impacts, the more the optimal budget allocation is dispersed among the counties. For
example, if a weight of 100% were assigned to maximizing the forest carbon benefit, the
total budget would be distributed optimally to 202 of the 288 counties. Most (64 counties)
of the 86 counties not receiving payments lost no forestland over the two periods. The
number of optimally targeted counties gradually declines as the weight assigned to
maximizing forest carbon benefits declines and the weight assigned to maximizing
economic impacts increases. When a weight of 100% is assigned to maximizing
economic impacts, the number of optimally targeted counties falls to 72. This discovery
results from a greater dispersion of economic impacts among counties relative to carbon
benefits (Figure 2.7.). Specifically, the coefficient of variation of economic impacts with
the maximum allocated budget is 3.50. For carbon benefits, the coefficient of variation is
2.50. Results from a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Massey 1951) indicate that
the distribution of economic impacts stochastically dominates the distribution of carbon
benefits (p-value < 0.05).
Second, under all weighting scenarios, consistently higher optimal budgets occur
in the counties of southern Appalachia (i.e. Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee and North
Carolina) and the southeastern end of Pennsylvania. The counties with optimal budget
allocations in the upper quartile in Figure 2.6. tend to have high economic-cost
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efficiencies regardless of the weight assigned for that objective. This finding implies that
economic-cost efficiency is important in allocating the optimal budget.
Third, assuming 50% of the maximum budget, 65 of 288 counties are consistently
chosen for optimal spatial targeting regardless of the weighting scenario. Of those
counties, 59 counties are among the top 65 counties ranked by highest economic-cost
efficiency, while only 21 counties are among the top 65 counties ranked by highest
carbon-cost efficiency. These findings suggest that economic-cost efficiency is a
relatively more dominant objective in the targeting decision than the objective of carboncost efficiency. Again, this pattern of optimization is likely related to a greater dispersion
of economic-cost efficiency relative to carbon-cost efficiency.
Figure 2.8. illustrates three carbon-economic impact frontiers that reflect different
tradeoffs between forest carbon storage and economic impacts, given different weights
imposed between the two objectives for each budget scenario. For example, given a
weight of 100% assigned to maximizing forest carbon benefits at point A on the 50%budget frontier (i.e., 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 = 100% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 = 0%), the optimal budget distribution among

counties yields 296,215 tonnes of carbon storage and $1,360,551 of economic impacts
(see Table 2.3.). Reducing the weight on maximizing forest carbon storage to 87.5% and
increasing the weight on maximizing economic impacts to 12.5% (i.e., 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 = 87.5% and

𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 = 12.5%) at point B on the 50%-budget frontier, the optimal budget distribution yields
295,802 tonnes of carbon storage and $1,367,666 in economic impacts (see Table 2.3.).

The move from point A to point B implies that economic impacts increase by $7,115 with
a sacrifice of 413 tonnes of carbon storage, yielding a tradeoff ratio of 0.058 tonnes/$.
This tradeoff ratio suggests a sacrifice of 0.058 tonnes of forest carbon storage for a
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conservation agency wanting to achieve an additional $1 of economic impact. This
tradeoff ratio increases (or the amount of forest carbon storage forgone increases for an
additional $1 of economic impact) as the weight assigned to maximizing economic
impacts increases (e.g., tradeoff ratio of 6.566 tonnes/$ from the move of point C for the
scenario of 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 -12.5% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 -87.5% to point D for the scenario of 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 -0% and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 -

100%). This concave relationship between optimal carbon benefits and economic impacts
is consistent for the three budget scenarios and values for both objectives consistently
decrease with tighter budget scenarios.

4.

Conclusions
There is clear evidence suggesting that PES can serve the multiple objectives of

promoting efficient ecosystem services and providing positive economic impacts
(Miranda et al. 2003; Bulte et al. 2008; Sims et al. 2014). Nevertheless, PES targeting
criteria have mostly focused on promoting efficient conservation without concern for
providing positive economic impacts (Babcock et al. 1997; Ando et al. 1998; Barton et al.
2003; Ferraro 2004). Research is lacking on PES programs that serve both objectives.
Thus, it is critically important to understand optimal spatial PES targets and the tradeoffs
between the two objectives.
We developed an integrated empirical framework for identifying optimal spatial
PES targets with optimal payment budget distributions with tradeoffs between ecological
and economic impacts. Our case study deals with the two objectives of maximizing forest
carbon sequestration and the economic impact of PES at the county level in the Central
and Southern Appalachian Region of the United States. We evaluated the implications of
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different weighting scenarios between the two objectives for county-level optimal budget
distributions. In addition, we developed Pareto optimal frontiers under alternative total
budget constraints that assumed the given total budget could not be reallocated among
counties without sacrificing one objective for the other.
Maps of PES optimal budget distributions among counties, given different
weighting scenarios, provide evidence that, the greater the weight assigned to maximizing
forest carbon benefits relative to maximizing economic impacts, the more widespread the
optimal budget is allocated among the counties. This finding occurs since the economicimpact objective is more dominant in the targeting decision than the carbon-cost
efficiency objective, on average. This evidence suggests that incorporating economic
impacts in the targeting criteria, along with promoting cost-efficient conservation, is a
viable option. Our projections of county-level forest carbon storage and economic
impacts, given different weighting scenarios, help target optimal county-level PES budget
distributions and evaluate their effects on both objectives.
The Pareto optimal frontiers provide evidence that the optimal relationship
between forest carbon benefits and economic impacts is concave. Along a given Pareto
optimal frontier (i.e., a given PES total budget), (1) an increase in the weight assigned to
economic impacts with a corresponding decrease in the weight assigned to forest carbon
benefits increases economic impacts while reducing forest carbon benefits and vice versa,
and (2) the increase in economic impacts is relatively higher than the sacrifice in forest
carbon benefits when the initial weight assigned to economic impacts is relatively lower
than the initial weight assigned to forest carbon benefits and vice versa. Because of the
concavity of the Pareto optimal relationship, assigning greater weight to an objective,
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which is of minimal concern at the initial policy-making stage, makes sense if
conservation agencies add that objective to a multiple-objective targeting framework. For
example, assigning a positive weight to economic impacts yields higher economic
impacts for a lower sacrifice of forest carbon benefits when the initial optimal spatial
target focuses on promoting cost-efficient forest carbon benefits without concern for
providing economic impacts. The concavity of the Pareto optimal relationship can be
explained by the law of increasing opportunity cost, implying that as an increase in the
weight assigned to economic impacts (or forest carbon benefits) rises, the opportunity
cost of economic growth (or forest carbon benefits) increases (Nicholson and Snyder
2011).
The tradeoff between ecological benefits and economic impacts is not unique to
forest carbon storage, and many PES programs face the same issue. Our empirical
framework can be applied to other PES programs that have the dual objectives of
promoting efficient ecosystem services and providing economic impacts. This approach
takes advantage of multiple models in one framework to estimate values for both
objectives and inputs them into an optimization model. Hence, our framework is feasible
for PES programs when both ecological and economic impacts are available. For
example, our framework for spatial PES targeting can be used for the multiple objectives
of maximizing both biodiversity and economic impacts if a model can estimate changes
in regional biodiversity (e.g., species distribution model) that correspond with land-use
changes triggered by payments for biodiversity enhancement. The economic impacts of
the payments for biodiversity enhancement can then be quantified using an IMPLAN
model.
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As a final note, it is worth to point out other researchers’ claim that integrating
distributive impacts may undermine the major purpose of PES, improving the efficiency
of conservation of ecosystem services (Engel et al. 2008; TEEB 2010; Kinzig et al.
2011). This argument states that while PES has potential implications for other attributes
such as equitability, it is better to address these issues separately. The claim is based on
“Tinbergen rule” of the classical theory of economic policy (Tinbergen 1952) which
states an equal number of policy instruments should be applied to achieve a certain
number of policy targets. In practice, it may be better for local development if the
available budget is split and a portion is given to cost efficient forest conservation and
another portion to economic development. This contrasts with putting all funds allocated
to PES according to the Pareto optimal frontiers and hoping the payments trickle down to
local development. Overall, however, we still think it is important to understand spatial
targeting for PES as a means to undertake conservation goals while also promoting
economic impacts.
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Appendix
Table 2.1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Variables
Dependent variable
Change in forest share
Economic variables
Forest return relative
to crop return
Forest return relative
to pasture return
Forest return relative
to urban return
Geophysical variables
Average elevation

Definition

Ratio of forested area between the
beginning and the end of a given period
(i.e., 2001-2006 and 2006-2011)
First year’s annual forest return relative to
annual return from crops ($/hectare)
First year’s annual forest return relative to
annual return from pasture ($/hectare)
First year’s annual forest return relative to
annual return from urban use ($/hectare)
Average elevation (meter)

Average slope

Average slope (degree)

Appalachian forest
ecoregion
Cumberlands and southern
ridge and valley ecoregion
Alabama

1 if county is in central Appalachian forest
ecoregion, 0 otherwise
1 if county is in Cumberlands and Southern
Ridge and Valley ecoregion, 0 otherwise
1 if county is in Alabama,
0 otherwise
1 if county is in Georgia,
0 otherwise
1 if county is in Kentucky,
0 otherwise
1 if county is in Maryland,
0 otherwise
1 if county is in North Carolina,
0 otherwise
1 if county is in Pennsylvania,
0 otherwise
1 if county is in Tennessee,
0 otherwise
1 if county is in Virginia,
0 otherwise
1 if county is in West Virginia,
0 otherwise

Georgia
Kentucky
Maryland
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Virginia
West Virginia
Year variable
Period dummy variable

1 if period is 2006-2011,
0 otherwise
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Mean
(Std Dev)
0.991
(0.023)
-246.686
(915.712)
14.226
(21.020)
-53.017
(1,603.387)
71.063
(216.703)
2.485
(1.335)
0.340
(0.474)
0.479
(0.500)
0.097
(0.296)
0.079
(0.271)
0.121
(0.327)
0.013
(0.117)
0.083
(0.276)
0.131
(0.338)
0.152
(0.360)
0.190
(0.393)
0.118
(0.322)
0.500
(0.500)

Table 2.2. Parameter estimates from log-linear model (n = 576)
Variables

Coefficient
(Std Dev)
-0.004
(0.011)

Constant
Economic variables
Forest return relative to
crop return (× 0.00001)
Forest return relative to
pasture return (× 0.001)
Forest return relative to
urban return (× 0.00001)
Geophysical variables

0.005
(0.131)
0.048
(0.067)
0.629*
(0.068)

Average elevation (× 0.00001)

0.378
(0.751)
-0.049
(0.114)
-0.009
(0.005)
-0.012*
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.105)
0.001
(0.010)
0.001
(0.010)
0.013
(0.013)
0.008
(0.099)
0.012
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.101)
0.006
(0.010)
0.004
(0.010)

Average slope (× 0.01)
Appalachian forest ecoregion
Cumberlands and southern
ridge and valley ecoregion
Alabama (× 0.1)
Georgia
Kentucky
Maryland
North Carolina (× 0.1)
Pennsylvania
Tennessee (× 0.1)
Virginia
West Virginia
Year variable
Period dummy variable

0.005*
(0.002)

Note: * denotes significance at the 5% level.
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Table 2.3. Total carbon storage (TC), gross domestic product (GDP), carbon-cost efficiency (CCE), and economic-cost
efficiency (ECE) across nine weighting scenarios for three budget scenarios
Weight
combinations
(𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 / 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 )

75% of total budget

50% of total budget

25% of total budget

100.0 / 0.0
87.5 / 12.5

TC
(tonne)
304,706
304,362

GDP
($)
2,009,310
2,020,011

CCE
(tonne/$)
0.2635
0.2632

ECE
($/$)
1.737
1.747

TC
(tonne)
296,215
295,802

GDP
($)
1,360,552
1,367,666

CCE
(tonne/$)
0.384
0.383

ECE
($/$)
1.765
1.774

TC
(tonne)
225,685
224,093

GDP
($)
674,178
684,703

CCE
(tonne/$)
0.585
0.581

ECE
($/$)
1.749
1.776

75.0 / 25.0

304,105

2,024,047

0.2630

1.750

294,948

1,369,845

0.382

1.777

222,502

689,837

0.577

1.789

62.5 / 37.5

303,847

2,026,536

0.2628

1.752

293,850

1,371,336

0.381

1.779

220,721

693,912

0.572

1.800

50.0 / 50.0

303,599

2,028,704

0.2625

1.754

292,291

1,372,491

0.379

1.780

218,320

696,821

0.566

1.808

37.5 / 62.5

303,318

2,030,540

0.2623

1.756

289,838

1,373,595

0.376

1.782

214,840

699,566

0.557

1.815

25.0 / 75.0

302,879

2,032,036

0.2619

1.757

285,937

1,375,901

0.371

1.785

209,650

703,277

0.543

1.824

12.5 / 87.5
0.0 / 100.0

301,461
271,817

2,033,010
2,036,105

0.2607
0.2350

1.758
1.761

277,059
191,186

1,379,444
1,392,523

0.359
0.248

1.789
1.806

199,608
133,754

708,448
720,335

0.517
0.347

1.838
1.869

Note: 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 is the assigned weight for maximizing forest carbon storage and 𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒 is the assigned weight for maximize economic
impacts.
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Figure 2.1. Overview of study area
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Figure 2.2. Estimated total forestland area that would have been discouraged from
urban development subsequent to total increase of forest return (total payment to
forestland owners), holding urban return constant, for entire study area
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Figure 2.3. Spatial distribution of maximum allocated budget
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Figure 2.4. Spatial distribution of carbon-cost efficiency
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Figure 2.5. Spatial distribution of economic-cost efficiency
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100 : 0

87.5 : 12.5

75 : 25

62.5 : 37.5

50 : 50

37.5 : 62.5

25 : 75

12.5 : 87.5

0 : 100

Figure 2.6. Optimal allocated payment budget spatial distribution under the 50% budget scenario with nine weighting
scenarios involving the objectives of maximizing forest carbon storage and maximizing economic impacts (𝑾𝑾𝒄𝒄 : 𝑾𝑾𝒆𝒆 )
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Figure 2.7. Probability density distributions of forest carbon storage and economic
impacts
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Figure 2.8. Pareto optimal frontiers between optimal forest carbon storage and
economic impacts under three budget scenarios
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Chapter 3: Spatial targeting of payments for ecosystem services to achieve
conservation goals and promote social equity and economic impact
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Abstract
The objective of this research is to identify optimal spatial targets and optimally
distributed budgets that achieve the multiple objectives of improving cost efficiency of
payment systems for ecosystem services (PES) and promoting equity and economic
development through PES. Using multi-objective linear programming with three
objective functions obtained from four modeling frameworks (i.e., land-use model,
carbon simulation model, poverty alleviation model, and Impact Analysis for Planning
model), we derive optimal spatial distributions of payment budgets for four priority
scenarios. The results show that the optimal budgets are more geographically widespread
under the multiple-objective priority scenarios than under the single-objective of
maximizing carbon cost efficiency, and the optimal spatial distributions of the four
priority scenarios do not change appreciably across priority scenarios. By aggregating the
three objective values under the four priority scenarios, the relationships between the
three objectives are quantified. Changing the priority weights from 100% on carbon cost
efficiency to weights of 50% on carbon cost efficiency and 50% on poverty alleviation
efficiency or 50% on carbon cost efficiency and 50% on economic impact demonstrates
competitive trade-off between the objective of carbon cost efficiency and the objectives
of poverty alleviation and economic impact, and a synergistic relationship between
poverty alleviation and economic impact. Our findings can be used as a benchmark for
conservation agencies to distribute spatially targeted budgets depending on their
priorities.
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1.

Introduction

1.1.

Background and objective
As global concern mounts around the issue of climate change, increasing and

sustaining forest-based carbon sequestration has proven to be a cost-effective way of
mitigating atmospheric carbon (Dwyer et al. 1992). Despite its potential for climate
change mitigation, landowners do not consider the value of forest-based carbon
sequestration when making market-based land-use decisions. Payment systems for
ecosystem services (PES), like forest-based carbon sequestration, have received
considerable attention recently as a policy tool to internalize the value of ecosystem
services into land-use decision making (Engel et al. 2008; Farley and Costanza 2010).
Notwithstanding the recent popularity of PES, command and control government
engagement to improve ecosystem services is controversial due to cost ineffectiveness
(Harrington and Morgenstern 2004). Still, payments for forest-based carbon sequestration
have become more appealing with growing opportunities for private landowners to
participate in the forestry sector (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Kroeger and Casey
2007).
The use of PES is often viewed as a means to achieve conservation goals while
promoting social equity and rural economic development (Bremer et al. 2014). The
literature focusing on conservation goals has dealt with improving the cost efficiency of
PES related to return-on-investment (ROI) and spatial targeting (Babcock et al. 1997;
Antle et al. 2003; Barton et al. 2003; Ferraro 2004; Claassen et al. 2008; Engel et al.
2008; Gibbons et al. 2011; Armsworth et al. 2012; Hanley et al. 2012). These studies
commonly find that the cost efficiency of PES depends on the optimization of scarce
59

financial resources by accounting for the spatial distributions of the costs and benefits of
ecosystem services and their relationship (Antle et al. 2003).
The literature focusing on the balance among cost efficiency, social equity, and
rural economic development has evolved to help design PES that achieve conservation
goals while promoting social equity and rural economic development. Nevertheless, their
relationships are complex and include both trade-offs and synergies (Pascual et al. 2010;
Gross-Camp et al. 2012). The trade-off between cost efficiency and social equity in the
rural economic development framework is often quantified by developing an efficiencyequity frontier (Pascual et al. 2009; Pascual et al. 2010; Wu and Yu 2017). Likewise, a
synergistic relationship can be developed between achieving environmental objectives
through PES and improving social equity for a rural community (Zhang and Pagiola
2011; Barrett et al. 2013; Pascual et al. 2014; Kearney et al. 2017).
The literature emphasizes the need for PES design to integrate equity into
efficiency-driven spatial targeting (Pascual et al. 2014). Despite the need, few, if any,
studies that focus on improving cost efficiency of PES have integrated equity into the
spatial targeting decision-making process. Another gap in the literature is the lack of
studies that include both optimal spatial targeting and the economic impact of PES.
The objective of this research is to fill the gap in the PES literature by identifying
spatial targets that optimally allocate a given budget to achieve the multiple objectives of
improving cost efficiency and promoting equity and economic development. We evaluate
trade-off and synergistic relationships among the three objectives. We use the Central and
Southern Appalachian Region of the United States (see Figure 3.1.) as a case study to
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develop a county-level framework to identify optimal county targets and optimal budget
allocations for forest-based carbon sequestration that address the three objectives.
We implement the case study by using multi-objective linear programming
(MOLP) (Lieberman 2014) based on three objective functions: (i) maximizing forestbased carbon storage for improving cost efficiency, (ii) alleviating maximum poverty for
promoting equity, and (iii) promoting economic impact for economic development. The
MOLP is applied under multiple weighting scenarios among the three objectives, given a
fixed payment budget. By comparing the optimal solutions under the multiple weighting
scenarios, we evaluate trade-off and synergistic relationships among the objectives.
Our results will help conservation agencies understand how optimal spatial
targeting and optimal budget allocations change with different weighting schemes.
Specifically, conservation agencies can optimally target and allocate budgets to counties
based on their preferences among the different weighting scenarios with regard to the
trade-offs and synergies among the objectives of improving the cost efficiency of carbon
storage, decreasing poverty, and increasing economic impact of PES.

1.2.

Literature review
Improving the cost efficiency of PES requires accounting for spatial variations in

the benefits and opportunity costs of ecosystem services. However, measuring and
monitoring their benefits and costs is challenging and potentially expensive (Richards and
Stokes 2004; Kim and Langpap 2015). Researchers have attempted to overcome these
challenges through an approach that allows estimating the spatial heterogeneity in the
conservation benefits and opportunity costs (Antle 2003; Fraser 2009; Armsworth et al.
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2011; Gibbons et al. 2011; Lewis et al. 2011; Hanley et al. 2012; Polasky et al. 2014;
Kim and Langpap 2015). Despite abundant literature on the efficiency of incentive
payment approaches, the literature focusing on mitigating the financial burden of
providing ecosystem services often ignores the social equity and economic impacts of the
payments (Antle 2003; Barton et al. 2003; Montagnini and Nair 2004; Classen et al.
2008; Gibbons et al. 2011; Mason and Plantinga 2011; Armsworth et al. 2012; Cho et al.
2017).
A body of literature has evolved around the balance between cost efficiency and
social equity in a rural economic development framework mainly because PES are often
designed to meet environmental goals at the expense of equity (Pascual et al. 2014). An
important question motivating the literature deals with the balance between cost
efficiency and social equity in designing PES (Dietz and Atkinson 2010; Muradian et al.
2010; García-Amado et al. 2011; Narloch et al. 2011; Gross-Camp et al. 2012; Mahanty
2013; Kolinjivadi et al. 2015). An efficiency-equity frontier has been used to quantify this
trade-off (or synergistic) relationship to facilitate PES disign (e.g., Pascual et al. 2009;
Pascual et al. 2010; Wu and Yu 2017). The poverty rate or an equity indicator, such as
the Gini Coefficient, typically has been used to measure equity improvements through
PES (Zilberman et al. 2008; Pascual et al. 2010; Garcia-Amado et al. 2011; McDermott et
al. 2013; Wu and Yu 2017).
Although the literature has been successful in analyzing the relationship between
cost efficiency and social equity, few, if any, of those studies provide spatial targeting
information about how to geographically allocate a conservation budget. In addition, the
literature dealing with optimal spatial targeting downplays the economic impacts of PES
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(Mundell 2002). Thus, developing a framework that simultaneously addresses cost
efficiency, equity and economic development objectives is critical in evaluating optimal
spatial targeting of PES budgets.

2.

Method
We use four modeling frameworks, all at the county level, to establish the three

objective functions in the MOLP. For objective function (i), we develop a land-use model
(see subsection 2.1. for details) to determine the amount of forestland not converted to
other uses when the return to forestland increases due to forest-based carbon incentive
payments. We then use a carbon simulation model (see subsection 2.2. for details) to
determine the maximum forest-based carbon storage that can be supplied from the
forestland changes simulated by the land-use model. For objective function (ii), we
develop a poverty alleviation model to estimate the reduction in poverty resulting from
the incentive payments (see subsection 2.3. for details). For objective function (iii), we
use the Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) model to estimate the economic impact
per dollar invested through incentive payments (see subsection 2.4. for details). The
estimates obtained from the four models are the parameters and variables for the three
objective functions in the MOLP (see subsection 2.5. for details).
Our discussion focusses on the maps and relationships developed from the MOLP
and the results from the land-use and poverty alleviation models, which we developed for
this study. To simplify and to save space, we briefly discuss the carbon simulation and
IMPLAN models but do not report their results directly, although they are available upon
request. The MOLP uses the outputs from all four models, and thus we indirectly discuss
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the results from the carbon simulation and IMPLAN models. In addition, the parameters
of the carbon simulation and IMPLAN models come from available models developed
and estimated by the authors for other studies (Cho et al. 2018a, 2018b).

2.1.

Land-use model
Land-use change models have been used to estimate the relationship between

land-use choices and relative returns in the forestry and agricultural sectors for the
purposes of linking opportunity costs of forest and farmland with deforestation and
farmland loss, and they have been used to derive cost functions for forest- and farm-based
carbon storage (Lubowski et al. 2006; Lubowski et al. 2008). Aggregate land-use data,
such as our county-level data, have been used to explain how the share of land in counties
or larger geographic areas shifts from one land use to another over a transition period
(referred to as “land-use share model”) (e.g., Ahn et al. 2000; Hardie et al. 2000; Cho et
al. 2005; Sohngen and Brown 2006; Ahn 2008). Following the general framework of the
land-use share model, we specify the expected shares as a logistic function of a linear
combination of decision variables:
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘)

𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 )
= 𝐾𝐾
,
∑𝑘𝑘=1 exp(𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 )

(1)

where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘) is the expected share of land allocated to land-use 𝑘𝑘 in year t in county i, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
is a set of decision variables in year t in county i, and 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘′ is a vector of unknown
parameters.
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If we assume forestland and non-forestland are the only two land uses and divide
the share of forestland by the share of non-forestland (referred to as “relative forestland
share”), the logistic transformation of equation (1) yields:
′
′
ln�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘 = 1)/𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘 ≠ 1)� = 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘=1
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘≠1
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ,

(2)

where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘 = 1) and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘 ≠ 1) are, respectively, the share of forestland and the share of
non-forestland (crop, pasture, and urban land) in year t in county i. All variables that
explain spatial correlation among relative forestland shares cannot be included in
equation (2), which leads to biased estimates and spatially correlated errors (Cho and
Newman 2005; Carrión-Flores et al. 2009).
These problems are frequently handled by ad hoc specification using a spatial
weight matrix (Anselin 1988). Following the ad hoc approach, we hypothesize that the
natural log of relative forestland share for county i in year t is a function of forest return,
average return of non-forested land uses, and the relative forestland shares within the
𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
neighboring counties defined by the weight matrix, ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 (𝑘𝑘 = 1)/𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 (𝑘𝑘 ≠ 1),

where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is element (i, j) of the N × N spatial weight matrix W:

𝑦𝑦

𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
ln�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘 = 1)/𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘 ≠ 1)� = 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 + ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑦𝑦 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖

where j represents the jth neighboring county, X is a vector of explanatory variables
including annual forest return and annual average return of non-forested land uses
(weighted average of returns from crop, pasture, and urban lands, with land shares as
weights), 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 is a scaler parameter, 𝛿𝛿𝑦𝑦 is a parameter for spatially lagged relative

forestland share, 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦 is a parameter vector, 𝜇𝜇 𝑦𝑦 and 𝜆𝜆𝑦𝑦 respectively denote unobserved

spatial and time specific effects, and 𝜖𝜖 is an error term.
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(3)

Annual forest return is included in X because it is the baseline return for
sustaining forestland, while the weighted annual average return of non-forested land uses
controls for the effects of returns from other land uses on relative forestland share. Slope
and elevation variables control for the effects of topographic characteristics on relative
forestland share. Year dummy variables, indicating the years in which the relative
forestland shares are observed (i.e., 1992 and 2001 dummy variables and 2011 as a
reference year), capture the time specific effects. Ecoregion dummy variables (i.e.,
dummy variables for the Central Appalachian Forest Ecoregion and the Cumberlands and
Southern Ridge and Valley Ecoregion, with the Southern Blue Ridge Ecoregion as the
reference ecoregion) are included in 𝑋𝑋 to capture the spatial specific effects.

We aggregate data at a 30m × 30m resolution to the county level in 1992, 2001,

and 2011 from the National Land-Cover Dataset (NLCD) (U.S. Geological Survey 2016)
to construct county-level areas of forestland and non-forested land. We merge the NLCD
classifications of deciduous forest, evergreen forest, and mixed forest for forestland. Nonforested land includes the classifications of cultivated cropland, pasture/hay,
grass/herbaceous land, developed open space, developed low intensity, developed
medium intensity, developed high intensity, and other NLCD classifications.
We use Faustmann’s model (1849) to estimate forest return using the harvest
timber volume data from the Forest Inventory and Analysis database (U.S. Department of
Agriculture Forest Service 2017) and stumpage price data from Timber Mart-South
(2006, 2011). The average return of non-forested land uses is calculated by taking the
weighted average of crop, pasture, and urban returns, with land shares as weights, at the
county level for each of the three years. The details of how the four returns are calculated
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are provided in the supplementary materials in Cho et al. (2017). Average slope and
elevation at the county level are estimated using Zonal Statistics tool in ArcGIS 10.1
(ESRI 2012) and a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) (U.S. Geological Survey 2013).
We adopt the spatial panel model with an instrumental variable (IV) to deal with
the endogeneity of the forest return and average return of non-forested land uses that can
be caused by the error term being correlated with the return variables (See Table S.2. in
Appendix for the IV test and S.3. for the 1st stage land-use model). We estimate the
spatial panel IV model with Maximum Likelihood Spatial Autocorrelation (SAC) Panel
Regression using the STATA module of SPREGSACXT (Shehata and Mickaiel 2013).
See Table 3.1. for a detailed description of the variables used in the estimation.

2.2.

Carbon simulation model
We estimate changes in carbon storage from changes in relative forestland shares

at the county level in each year using a long-run dynamic ecological process called the
Terrestrial Ecosystem Model (TEM), housed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL) (2016). The TEM isolates changes in long-term stored carbon that would result
from changes in land use by focusing on a comparison between relative forestland shares
with and without payments. The TEM uses spatially-related information (i.e. climate,
elevation, soils and vegetation) to estimate the carbon, nitrogen and water fluxes for each
vegetation cohort, with cohorts aggregated within each county to conform with the
resolution of the land-use model (ORNL 2016). The number of cohorts in a county varies
according to vegetation types and their areas within each 1 km2 grid cell (Gutman and
Reissell 2011). Carbon storage is calculated using monthly estimates provided by the
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TEM cohort-level carbon pools for each of the four years and grid cells, based on
integrating the monthly fluxes to account for the net total of carbon uptake through
photosynthesis against carbon losses.

2.3.

Poverty alleviation model
While PES do not target poverty alleviation exclusively, incentive payments are

assumed to be similar to subsidy programs that target poverty alleviation. Numerous
studies deal with the consequences of subsidy programs that focus on various aspects of
poverty, such as health care, housing, education, and public welfare (Rosen 1985;
Smeeding et al. 1993; Besley and Kanbur 1998; Santiago et al. 2001; Schultz 2004; Fan
et al. 2008; Mehmood and Sadiq 2010; Jung et al. 2015; Remler et al. 2017). Those
studies quantify the impacts on poverty reduction by assuming that assistance to the poor
through subsidy programs positively affect reducing poverty (Fan et al. 2000; Afonso and
St Aubyn 2004; Smeeding 2006). In addition, those studies have demonstrated the spatial
nature of poverty (Friedman and Lichter 1998; Blank 2005; Partridge and Rickman 2005;
DeNavas-Walt 2010).
Given evidence from the poverty literature, spatially persistent poverty rates are
expected to decline over time as annual forest returns increase through incentive
payments. Thus, we hypothesize that the poverty rate in county i, in year t+n minus
poverty rate in year t (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛~𝑡𝑡 , referred to as “poverty rate mitigation”) is a function of

forest return and average return of non-forested land uses (i.e., urban, pasture, and crop)
and poverty rates in year t within the neighboring counties defined by the weight matrix,
𝑡𝑡
∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 , where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is element (i, j) of the N × N spatial weight matrix W. We test
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the hypothesis by estimating the following spatial panel model similar to Jung et al.
(2015):
𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛~𝑡𝑡 ) = 𝛼𝛼 + ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 𝛿𝛿 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ,

(4)

where j represents the jth county, X is a vector of explanatory variables including forest
return and average return of non-forested land uses, demographic and employment
characteristics, and the time-period dummy variable (i.e., 1 for observation in t+n = 2001
and t = 1992, 0 for observation in t+n = 2011 and t = 2001), 𝛼𝛼 is a constant parameter, 𝛿𝛿
is a parameter for the spatially lagged poverty rate, 𝛽𝛽 is a parameter vector, 𝜇𝜇 and 𝜆𝜆

respectively denote unobserved spatial and time specific effects, and 𝜀𝜀 is an error term.

Note that the poverty rate is the percentage of individuals with incomes below the US
Census Bureau poverty threshold based on the family size and the age of its member
(U.S. Census Bureau 2017a).

Previous literature shows that income derived from natural-resource use plays a
significant role in mitigating poverty (Cavendish 1999; Reddy and Chakravarty 1999;
Adhikari 2003; Fisher 2004; Narain et al. 2008; Nielsen et al. 2012; Fonta and Ayuk
2013). The forest return captures the effect of forest return on poverty mitigation and can
be used to simulate the effect on poverty mitigation of hypothetical carbon incentive
payments. The average return of non-forested land uses captures the effect on the poverty
rate of the returns from other land uses as alternatives income sources. We hypothesize
that both the forest return and the average return of non-forested land in year t are
positively related to poverty mitigation between years t and t+n.
The demographic variables include racial composition (i.e., population
percentages of White, Asia-Pacific Islanders, and other races) with the population
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percentage of Blacks as the reference category; age distribution (i.e., population
percentages below 18 years of age, between 18 and 24 years, 65 years of age or older)
with the population percentage between 25 and 64 years of age as the reference category;
and socioeconomic status (i.e., population percentages with difficulty speaking English,
female household heads, at least some college education, living in multiple-worker
households) with the population percentages not in these respective categories as the
reference categories. The employment variables include percentages of total employment
in different industries (i.e., agriculture, manufacture, public, finance, and leisure) with the
information, professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management
service industries (referred to as “other employment percentage”) as the reference
category. The demographic and employment variables are control variables that influence
changes in the poverty rate (e.g., House 1989; Fujiura and Yamaki 2000; Aassve et al.
2006; Hoynes et al. 2006; Engster 2012; Jung et al. 2015). The demographic and
employment data are collected from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1990) and the
U.S. Census Bureau (2000, 2010).
We failed to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the forest return and the
average return of non-forested land uses at the 5% significance level. Thus, we estimated
the spatial panel model without IV with Maximum Likelihood Estimation Spatial
Autocorrelation (SAC) Panel Regression using the STATA module of SPREGSACXT
(Shehata and Mickaiel 2013). See Table 3.2. for a detailed description of the variables
used in the estimation.
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2.4.

Impact analysis for planning
The IMPLAN model uses a regional social accounting system and generates a set

of balanced economic/social accounts and multipliers. The social accounting system is an
extension of input-output analysis. Input-output analysis can provide important and
timely information on the interrelationships in a regional economy and the impacts of
changes on that economy. To estimate the economic impacts of payments for ecosystem
services, expenditures on various inputs were incorporated into IMPLAN. Input‐output
models analyze the interdependence of industries in an economy through market-based
transactions. The model describes the transfer of money between industries and
institutions and contains both market and non‐market financial flows, such as inter
institutional transfers. Output from the model includes descriptive measures of the
economy including total industry output (i.e., economic activity), total value‐added, state
and local taxes, and employment for 536 industries in the study region's economy. We
used the total value-added to represent the economic impact from the PES because total
value-added is considered gross domestic product and usually represents overall
development (Anríquez and Stamoulis 2007). The IMPLAN model utilizes a National
Trade Flows Model (NTFM) (doubly‐constrained gravity model) to estimate a new set of
regional purchase coefficients and other trade data that predict local purchases based on a
region’s characteristics (Lindall et al. 2006). Not only can the model be used to describe a
regional economy, but the model also can be used for predictive purposes, by providing
estimates of multipliers. This analysis uses the local purchase percentages option
available in the IMPLAN modeling. These percentages affect the impact values applied
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to the multipliers. The multiplier impacts can be used to evaluate, measure, and compare
results of different economic scenarios.

2.5.

Multi-objective linear programming
We use MOLP for the three objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon

storage, alleviating maximum poverty, and promoting maximum economic impacts.
Following Lieberman (2014)’s two-step optimization procedure, we use a singleobjective optimization problem for each of the three objectives in the first step using a
Matlab module called fmincon and a multi-objective optimization problem in the second
step using a Matlab module called fminimax (MathWorks 2017a, 2017b).
In the first step, decision variables (i.e., a continuous decimal number from 0 to 1
with 0 defining zero share and 1 full share of forestland in each county) are determined
by satisfying each of the three objectives separately under a hypothetical annual budget of
$5 million (50% of budget needed to reach maximum carbon storage capacity). In the
second step, new decision variables that satisfy all three objectives at the same time are
determined by minimizing the maximum percentage gap between the three single target
values (i.e., sum of products of the decision variables from the first step and the total
quantity of their respective objective values) and their corresponding multi-objective
optimal values (i.e., sum of products of the new decision variables and the total quantity
of their respective objective values) for each county under the budget constraint. The
three percentage gaps are multiplied by four types of hypothetical weight values (i.e., 1
type of single objective of 100% weight on maximizing forest carbon storage; 2 types of
dual objectives of 50% weight on maximizing forest carbon storage and 50% weight on
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alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity and 50% weight on maximizing forest
carbon storage and 50% on promoting economic impact for economic development; 1
type of triple objectives of 33% weight on maximizing forest carbon storage, 33% weight
on alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity, 33% weight on promoting
economic impact for economic development) to represent policy priority scenarios
between the three objectives.

3.

Empirical results and discussion
Table 3.3. reports the parameter estimates and standard errors from the land-use

model in equation (3) based on an inverse-distance weight matrix. Our choice of that
model is based the model with the minimum log-likelihood ratio (LLR). (See Table S.4.
in Appendix for the full report of LLR for the all candidate models.) The overall
performance of the model is reflected in its adjusted R2 of 0.526. The F-test statistics of
233.784 indicates that the overall estimation of the model is significant at the 5% level.
The parameter estimates and lack of statistical significance of the spatial lag dependent
variable and the spatial error variable imply that the problem of spatially correlated
missing variables is not as extensive as is suggested in the literature, which is likely due
to the use county-level data (Chou 1991).
The significant (5% level) estimate of the forest return variable (0.03) suggests
that an increase of forest return by $1/hectare increases the relative forestland share in
each county by 0.03%. This result is crucial to our analysis because it indicates that
supplying forest-based carbon storage is feasible through a carbon incentive payment
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system, and that the impacts on the county-level amounts of forest-carbon storage
supplied can be estimated using the carbon simulation model.
As for the geophysical variables, parameter estimates for the average elevation,
slope and ecoregion dummy variables are significant at the 5% level, suggesting the
importance of these control variables in estimating parameter of the forest return variable.
The estimation suggests that counties with higher elevations and steeper slopes tend to
have greater relative forestland share. Also, signs of the two ecoregion dummy variables
suggest that relative forestland shares are lower in the Cumberlands and Southern Ridge
and Valley Ecoregion, and in the Central Appalachian Forest Ecoregion than in the
Southern Blue Ridge Ecoregion. These findings reflect that topographic characteristics of
the Southern and Central Appalachian Region are such that more forest cover tends to be
in landscape regions with high elevation and steep slope and more dense forest cover
exist in Southern Blue Ridge Ecoregion than in the other two ecoregions. The more dense
forest cover in Sothern Blue Ridge Ecoregion may be relevant to the fact that this
ecoregion has the third highest number of hardwood and conifer endemics in North
America (Ricketts et al. 1999).
The parameter estimates for the 1992 and 2001 year dummy variables suggest that
the relative forestland share in 1992 was greater than in 2011, but the relative forestland
share in 2001 was smaller than in 2011. These findings suggest that afforestation and
reforestation efforts between 2001 and 2011 may have been successful and/or that
deforestation diminished during that period perhaps partially due to the great recession of
2007-2009, although forestland decreased on average over the 19-year study period.
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Table 3.4. reports parameter estimates and corresponding standard errors of the
poverty model in equation (4) using the 9-nearest neighbor weight matrix (KNN=9). The
KNN=9 model has the minimum LLR (see Table S.4. in Appendix for the full report).
The adjusted R2 of the model is 0.773 and the F-statistics of 257.402 is significant at the
5% level, suggesting that the model performs relatively well in terms of explanatory
power. The spatial lag and error variables are not significant at the 5% level.
The parameter estimate for the forest return variable in the poverty model is 0.016 and significant at the 5% level, implying that an increase of forest return by
$1/hectare yields an average poverty rate reduction of 1.6% annually over the 19-year
period. This finding suggests that forest return has a significant effect on mitigating
poverty, and thus forest-based carbon incentive payments that trigger an increase in forest
return would not only increase carbon storage, but also mitigate poverty. Thus, dollars
expended on incentive payments to prevent forestland conversion to other land uses
would mitigate poverty as well.
The parameter estimates for three variables (i.e., population percentages between
18 and 24 years of age, living in households with two or more workers, and employment
in manufacture) are significant at the 5% level. The positive sign on the percentage of
population between 18 and 24 years of age suggests that an increase in this variable,
relative to the population percentage between 25 and 64 years of age at the beginning of
each period, increases the poverty rate at the end of each period. The negative sign on the
population percentage living in households with two or more workers suggests that an
increase in this variable at the beginning of each period prompts a reduction in the
poverty rate at the end of each period. The positive sign on the percentage of employment
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in the manufacturing sector suggests that higher employment in manufacturing, relative
to the employment percentage in other sectors at the beginning of each period, increases
the poverty rate at the end of each period. This finding is explained by the fact that
manufacturing employment increased in 27% of counties (76 out of 285 counties), and in
all of these counties, the employment percentage in other sectors decreased during the
study period. Thus, the finding is logical considering other sectors generally have higher
wages than the manufacturing sector. The parameter estimate of 1992-2001 dummy
variable suggests that the poverty rate during the 1992-2001 period was lower than during
the 2001-2011 period. This finding makes sense given the poverty rate increased in the
United States by 1.3 percentage points from 13 percent to 14.3 percent during the great
recession of 2007-2009 (U.S. Census Bureau 2017b).
Figures 3.2.-a, 3.2.-b, 3.2.-c, and 3.2.-d show optimal spatial distributions of
payment budgets for a single objective weight, two types of dual objective weights, and
triple objective weights, respectively, reflecting different priorities between the three
objectives (referred to as priority scenarios I, II, III, and IV). Figure 3.2.-a illustrates the
spatial distribution of an optimally allocated budget among counties for 100% priority on
cost efficiency of carbon storage. The spatial distribution of this optimally allocated
budget follows the patterns of the spatial distribution of annual average carbon cost
efficiencies during the 2001-2011 period shown in Appendix S.5. This visual assessment
is reinforced for priority scenario I in Table 3.5., which presents the quantities of forest
carbon sequestration per dollar spent for the four quartiles of the optimally allocated
budget (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) shown in Figure 3.2.-a. The general pattern shows that larger
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budgets are allocated to the counties with higher carbon quantities per dollar spent when
the payment priority is 100% on maximizing carbon cost efficiency.
The panels of Figure 3.2. illustrate spatial distributions of optimally allocated
budgets when the priority weights are 50% on carbon cost efficiency and 50% on poverty
alleviation (Figure 3.2.-b); the priority weights are 50% on carbon cost efficiency and
50% on economic impact (Figure 3.2.-c); and the priority weights are divided equally
among the three objectives of carbon cost efficiency, poverty alleviation, and economic
impact (Figure 3.2.-d). Table 3.5. shows that the spatial patterns of the optimal budget
allocations for priority scenarios II, III, and IV are difficult generalize from the
efficiencies of the objectives in the multiple-objective cases, because more than one
objective is satisfied in deciding how to optimally allocation the payment budget.
Figures 3.2.-a, 3.2.-b, 3.2.-c, and 3.2.-d illustrate that 63% of counties (or 181 of
285 counties) are selected for optimal spatial targeting under priority scenario I, while
74%, 70%, and 73% of counties are selected for optimal spatial targeting under priority
scenarios II, III, and IV for multiple-objective budget allocations. These findings suggest
that the spatial targeting of the optimal budget is more widespread among the counties
under the multiple-objective priority scenarios than under the single-objective of
maximizing carbon cost efficiency. The results also indicate that the optimal spatial
distributions do not change appreciably among the four priority scenarios. For example,
79% of counties (or 44 of 56 counties) remained consistently in the upper quartile of the
optimal budget allocations of the four priority scenarios. Those targeted counties are in a
cluster of counties in Pennsylvania, in a cluster of counties in Alabama, and in counties
more widely dispersed within the study area.
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Table 3.6. shows trade-off and synergistic relationships among the three
objectives for the four priority scenarios. In going from priority scenario I (100% priority
on carbon cost efficiency) to priority scenario II (50% priority on carbon cost efficiency
and 50% priority on poverty alleviation), 228 persons (or 9.8% increase) are lifted from
poverty and economic activity increases by $126,967 (or 1.1% increase), for a sacrifice of
5,866 tonnes of carbon storage (or 2.7% decrease). Likewise, in going from priority
scenario I to III (50% priority on carbon cost efficiency and 50% priority on economic
impact), the economic impact increases by $150,181 (or 1.2% increase) and 667 persons
(or 28.6% increase) are lifted from poverty, for a sacrifice of 9,923 tonnes of carbon
storage (or 4.6% decrease). These examples demonstrate the competitive relationships
between the objective of carbon cost efficiency and the objectives of poverty alleviation
and economic impact, and a synergistic relationship between poverty alleviation and
economic impact. The synergic effects in both examples suggest that, regardless of
whether the 50% weight is placed on poverty alleviation or on economic impact, placing
some priority on either objective reduces poverty and increases economic activity through
optimal budget reallocations. The synergic effects likely occur likely because counties
with higher poverty alleviation efficiency and counties with higher economic impact
efficiency tend to overlap. For example, 69.6% (39 of 56) counties are in the upper
quartiles (i.e., Q1) of both poverty alleviation efficiency and economic impact efficiency
(Appendix S.5).
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4.

Conclusions
The literature on spatial targeting of conservation investments like PES has

extensively focused on improving cost efficiency as measured by ROI (e.g., Barton et al.
2013). The results help conservation agencies allocate scarce financial resources by
accounting for the spatial distributions of the conservation costs and benefits of
ecosystem services and their relationships. Although such efforts are important in
improving PES cost efficiency, they neglect other important PES objectives, namely
promoting social equity and rural economic development (Mundell 2002; Pascual et al.
2009). To fill the gap, our research addresses the need to identify optimal spatial targeting
and distributions of a fixed PES budget that achieve the three objectives of maximizing
forest-based carbon storage to improve cost efficiency, maximizing poverty alleviation to
promote equity, and maximizing economic impact to encourage economic development
using the Central and Southern Appalachian Region of the United States as a case study.
We also evaluate the trade-off and synergistic relationships using four scenarios with
different priority weights among the three objectives.
Using MOLP with three objective functions obtained from four modeling
frameworks (i.e., land-use model, carbon simulation model, poverty alleviation model,
and IMPLAN), we derive the optimal spatial distributions of payment budgets for the
four priority scenarios. The maps of the optimal spatial distributions show that the
targeting of the optimal budget is more widespread among the counties under the
multiple-objective priority scenarios than under the single-objective of maximizing
carbon cost efficiency, and that the optimal spatial budget distributions of the four
priority scenarios do not change appreciably.
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The relationships among the objectives are quantified by aggregating and
comparing the three objective values under the four priority scenarios. The quantified
relationships reveal that different priority weights among the priority scenarios yield both
competitive trade-offs and synergistic relationships between the objectives. Changing the
priority weights from 100% on carbon cost efficiency to weights of 50% on carbon cost
efficiency and 50% on poverty alleviation efficiency or 50% on carbon cost efficiency
and 50% on economic impact demonstrates competitive trade-off between the objective
of carbon cost efficiency and the objectives of poverty alleviation and economic impact,
and a synergistic relationship between poverty alleviation and economic impact. We
believe the synergic relationship likely occurs because higher poverty alleviation
efficiency and higher economic impact efficiency tend to occur in the same counties.
The optimal spatial budget distributions under different priority scenarios can be
used to spatially target PES budgets to encourage forest-based carbon storage, or other
conservation goals, while also promoting social equity through poverty alleviation and
rural economic development through increased economic activity. Although the
optimally allocated budget with the single objective of carbon-cost efficiency is not
substantially different from the solutions for the multiple-objective optimization
problems, adjustments can be made in spatial targeting and spatially allocated budget
amounts based on our results. Further, the quantified trade-off and synergistic
relationships among the three objectives can be used by conservation agencies to assess
the costs (trade-offs) or benefits (synergies) of the priorities they place on the objectives.
Thus, our modeling framework can help conservation agencies adjust their priorities to

80

address other objectives when they view the cost of achieving a single conservation too
high in terms of other objectives sacrificed.

81

References
Aassve, A., M. Iacovou, and L. Mencarini. 2006. “Youth poverty and transition to
adulthood in Europe.” Demographic Research 15 (2): 21-50.
Adhikari, B. 2003. Property Rights and Natural Resources: Socio-Economic
Heterogeneity and Distributional Implications of Common Property Resource
Management. Kathmandu, Nepal: SANDEE.
Afonso, A., and M. St Aubyn. 2004. “Non-parametric approaches to education and health
expenditure efficiency in OECD countries.” Journal of Applied Economics 8: 227246.
Ahn, S. 2008. “How feasible is carbon sequestration in Korea? A study on the costs of
sequestering carbon in forest.” Environmental and Resource Economics 41 (1):
89-109.
Ahn, S., A.J. Plantinga, and R.J. Alig. 2000. “Predicting future forestland area: a
comparison of econometric approaches.” Forest Science 46 (3): 363-376.
Anríquez, G., and K. Stamoulis. 2007. “Rural development and poverty reduction: is
agriculture still the key?” Journal of Agricultural and Development Economics
4 (1): 5-46.
Anselin, L. 1988. “Lagrange multiplier test diagnostics for spatial dependence and spatial
heterogeneity.” Geographical Analysis 20 (1): 1-17.
Antle, J., S. Capalbo, S. Mooney, E. Elliott, and K. Paustian. 2003. “Spatial
heterogeneity, contract design, and the efficiency of carbon sequestration policies
for agriculture.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46 (2):
231-250.
82

Armsworth, P.R., L. Cantú-Salazar, M. Parnell, Z.G. Davies, and R. Stoneman. 2011.
“Management costs for small protected areas and economies of scale in habitat
conservation.” Biological Conservation 144 (1): 423-429.
Armsworth, P.R., S. Acs, M. Dallimer, K.J. Gaston, N.D. Hanley, and P. Wilson.
2012. “The cost of policy simplification in conservation incentive programs.”
Ecology Letters 15 (5): 406-414.
Babcock, B.A., P.G. Lakshminarayan, J. Wu, and D. Zilberman. 1997. “Targeting tools
for the purchase of environmental amenities.” Land Economics 325-339.
Barrett, C.B., E.H. Bulte, P. Ferraro, and S. Wunder. 2013. “Economic instruments for
nature conservation.” Key Topics in Conservation Biology 2 (2013): 59-73.
Barton, D., D. Faith, G. Rusch, J.O. Gjershaug, M. Castro, M. Vega, and E. Vega. 2003.
“Spatial prioritisation of environmental service payments for biodiversity
protection.” Report SNR 4746/ 2003. Norsk Institutt for vannforskning, Oslo.
Barton, D., S. Blumentrath, and G. Rusch. 2013. “Policyscape-a spatially explicit
evaluation of voluntary conservation in a policy mix for biodiversity conservation
in Norway.” Society & Natural Resources 26 (10): 1185-1201.
Besley, T., and R. Kanbur. 1988. “Food subsidies and poverty alleviation.” The Economic
Journal 98 (392): 701-719.
Blank, R.M. 2005. “Poverty, policy, and place: How poverty and policies to alleviate
poverty are shaped by local characteristics.” International Regional Science
Review 28 (4): 441-464.
Bremer, L.L., K.A. Farley, and D. Lopez-Carr. 2014. “What factors influence
participation in payment for ecosystem services programs? An evaluation of
83

Ecuador's SocioPáramo program.” Land Use Policy 36: 122-133.
Carrión-Flores, C.E., A. Flores-Lagunes, and L. Guci. 2009. “Land use change: a spatial
multinomial choice analysis.” Paper presented at Agricultural and Applied
Economics Association 2009 Annual Meeting.
Cavendish, W. 1999. Poverty, Inequality and Environmental Resources: Quantitative
Analysis of Rural Households. Oxford: Centre for the Study of African
Economies, Institute of Economics and Statistics, University of Oxford.
Cho, S., J. Lee, R.K. Roberts, B.C. English, E.T. Yu, T. Kim, and P.R. Armsworth.
2017. “Evaluating a tax-based subsidy approach for forest carbon sequestration.”
Environmental Conservation 44 (3): 234-243. Available at: https://www.cambridge
.org/core/journals/environmental-conservation/article/evaluating-a-taxbasedsubsidy-approach-for-forest-carbon-sequestration/A80E3AEC30570E77A40D966F
8654EE49#fndtn-supplementary-materials
Cho, S., and D.H. Newman. 2005. “Spatial analysis of rural land development.” Forest
Policy and Economics 7 (5): 732-744.
Cho, S., J. Lee, R.K. Roberts, T.E. Yu, and P.R. Armsworth. 2018a. “Impact of market
conditions on the effectiveness of payments for forest-based carbon
sequestration.” Forest Policy and Economics 92: 33-42.
Cho, S., M. Soh, B.C. English, T.E. Yu, and C. Boyer. 2018b. “Targeting payments for
ecosystem services given ecological and economic objectives.” Unpublished,
University of Tennessee.
Cho, S., J. Wu, and R. Alig. 2005. “Land development under regulation: Comparison
between the east and west sides of the Cascade Range in Oregon, Washington,
84

and California.” Review of Urban & Regional Development Studies 17 (1): 1-17.
Chou, Y.H. 1991. “Map resolution and spatial autocorrelation.” Geographical
Analysis 23 (3): 228-246.
Claassen, R., A. Cattaneo, and R. Johansson. 2008. “Cost-effective design of agrienvironmental payment programs: US experience in theory and practice.”
Ecological Economics 65 (4): 737-752.
DeNavas-Walt, C., B.D. Proctor, and C.H. Lee. 2006. Income, Poverty and Health
Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2005. Current Population Reports,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Dietz, S., and G. Atkinson. 2010. “The equity-efficiency trade-off in environmental
policy: Evidence from stated preferences.” Land Economics 86 (3): 423-443.
Dwyer, J.F., E.G. McPherson, H.W. Schroeder, and R.A. Rowntree. 1992. “Assessing the
benefits and costs of the urban forest.” Journal of Arboriculture 18: 227-227.
Engel, S., S. Pagiola, and S. Wunder. 2008. “Designing payment for environmental
services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues.” Ecological Economics
65 (4): 663-674.
Engster, D. 2012. “Child poverty and family policies across eighteen wealthy Western
democracies.” Journal of Children and Poverty 18 (2): 121-139.
ESRI. 2012. ArcGIS Help 10.1: Spatial Analyst Toolsets, ArcGIS Resources.
Available at: http://www.esri.com/
Fan, S., A. Gulati, and S. Thorat. 2008. “Investment, subsidies, and pro‐poor growth in
rural India.” Agricultural Economics 39 (2): 163-170.
Fan, S., P. Hazell, and S. Thorat. 2000. “Government spending, growth and poverty in
85

rural India.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82 (4): 1038-1051.
Farley, J., and R. Costanza. 2010. “Payments for ecosystem services: From local to
global.” Ecological Economics 69 (11): 2060-2068.
Faustmann, M. 1849. Calculation of the Value Which Forest Land and Immature Stands
Possess for Forestry. In M. Gane, ed, Martin Faustmann and the Evolution of
Discounted Cash Flow. University of Oxford.
Ferraro, P.J. 2004. “Targeting conservation investments in heterogenous landscapes: a
distance function approach and application to watershed management.” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 86 (4): 905-918.
Fisher, M. 2004. “Household welfare and forest dependence in Southern
Malawi.” Environment and Development Economics 9 (2): 135-154.
Fonta, W.M., and E.T. Ayuk. 2013. “Measuring the role of forest income in mitigating
poverty and inequality: evidence from south-eastern Nigeria.” Forests, Trees and
Livelihoods 22 (2): 86-105.
Fraser, R. 2009. “Land heterogeneity, agricultural income forgone and environmental
benefit: An assessment of incentive compatibility problems in environmental
stewardship schemes.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 60 (1): 190-201.
Friedman, S., and D.T. Lichter. 1998. “Spatial inequality and poverty among American
children.” Population Research and Policy Review 17 (2): 91-109.
Fujiura, G.T., and K. Yamaki. 2000. “Trends in demography of childhood poverty and
disability.” Exceptional Children 66 (2): 187-199.
García-Amado, L.R., M.R. Pérez, F.R. Escutia, S.B. García, and E.C. Mejía. 2011.

86

“Efficiency of payments for environmental services: equity and additionality in a
case study from a biosphere reserve in Chiapas, Mexico.” Ecological
Economics 70 (12): 2361-2368.
Gibbons, J.M., E. Nicholson, E.J. Milner-Gulland, and J.P. Jones. 2011. “Should
Payments for 22 Biodiversity Conservation be Based on Action or Results?”
Journal of Applied Ecology 48 (5): 1218–1226.
Gross-Camp, N.D., A. Martin, S. McGuire, B. Kebede, and J. Munyarukaza. 2012.
“Payments for ecosystem services in an African protected area: exploring issues of
legitimacy, fairness, equity and effectiveness.” Oryx 46 (1): 24-33.
Gutman, G., and A. Reissell, eds. 2011. Eurasian Arctic Land Cover and Land Use in a
Changing Climate. Springer.
Hanley, N., S. Banerjee, G.D. Lennox, and P.R. Armsworth. 2012. “How should we
incentivize private landowners to ‘produce’ more biodiversity?” Oxford Review of
Economic Policy 28 (1): 93-113.
Harrington, W., and R.D. Morgenstern. 2004. “Economic Incentives versus Command
and Control: What’s the Best Approach for Solving Environmental Problems?”
Resources 152: 13-17. Available at: http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/
WorkImages/Download/RFF_Resources_152_ecoincentives.pdf
Hardie, I., P. Parks, P. Gottleib, and D. Wear. 2000. “Responsiveness of rural and urban
land uses to land rent determinants in the US South.” Land Economics 659-673.
House, W.J. 1989. “Demography employment and poverty at the household level in
urban Juba Southern Sudan.” WEP Working Paper No 168, Geneva: International
Labour Office.
87

Hoynes, H.W., M.E. Page, and A.H. Stevens. 2006. “Poverty in America: Trends and
explanations.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (1): 47-68.
Jung, S., S. Cho, and R.K. Roberts. 2015. “The impact of government funding of poverty
reduction programmes.” Papers in Regional Science 94 (3): 653-675.
Kearney, S.P., S.J. Fonte, E. García, P. Siles, K.M.A. Chan, and S.M. Smukler. 2017.
“Evaluating ecosystem service trade-offs and synergies from slash-and-mulch
agroforestry systems in El Salvador.” Ecological Indicators. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2017.08.032
Kim, T., and C. Langpap. 2015. “Incentives for carbon sequestration using forest
management.” Environmental and Resource Economics 62 (3): 491-520.
Kolinjivadi, V., A. Grant, J. Adamowski, and N. Kosoy. 2015. “Juggling multiple
dimensions in a complex socio-ecosystem: The issue of targeting in payments for
ecosystem services.” Geoforum 58: 1-13.
Kroeger, T., and F. Casey. 2007. “An assessment of market-based approaches to
providing ecosystem services on agricultural lands.” Ecological Economics 64 (2):
321-332.
Landell-Mills, N., and I.T. Porras. 2002. Silver Bullet or Fools' Gold: a Global Review
of Markets for Forest Environmental Services and Their Impact on the Poor.
London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
Lewis, D.J., A.J. Plantinga, E. Nelson, and S. Polasky. 2011. “The efficiency of voluntary
incentives policies for preventing biodiversity loss.” Resource and Energy
Economics 33 (1): 192- 211.
Lieberman, E.R. 2014. Multi-objective Programming in the USSR. G.J. Lieberman,
88

and I. Olkin, eds. Academic Press.
Lindall, S., Olson, and G. Alward. 2006. “Deriving multi-regional models using the
IMPLAN national trade flows model.” Paper presented at Regional Science
Association International meeting, Sante Fe, New Mexico.
Lubowski, R.N., A.J. Plantinga, and R.N. Stavins. 2006. “Land-Use Change and Carbon
Sinks: Econometric Estimation of the Carbon Sequestration Supply Function.”
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51 (2): 135-152.
Lubowski, R.N., A.J. Plantinga, and R.N. Stavins. 2008. “What drives land-use change in
the United States? A national analysis of landowner decisions.” Land
Economics 84 (4): 529-550.
Mahanty, S., H. Suich, and L. Tacconi. 2013. “Access and benefits in payments for
environmental services and implications for REDD+: Lessons from seven PES
schemes.” Land Use Policy 31: 38-47.
Mason, C.F., and A.J. Plantinga. 2011. Contracting for Impure Public Goods: Carbon
Offsets and Additionality (No. w16963). National Bureau of Economic Research.
MathWorks. 2017a. fmincon Documentation.
Available at: https://www.mathworks.com/help/optim/ug/fmincon.html
MathWorks. 2017b. fminimax Documentation.
Available at: https://www.mathworks.com/help/optim/ug/fminimax.html
McDermott, M., S. Mahanty, and K. Schreckenberg. 2013. “Examining equity: a
multidimensional framework for assessing equity in payments for ecosystem
services.” Environmental Science & Policy 33: 416-427.
Mehmood, R., and S. Sadiq. 2010. “The relationship between government expenditure
89

and poverty: a cointegration analysis.” Romanian Journal of Fiscal Policy 1 (1):
29-37.
Montagnini, F., and P.K.R. Nair. 2004. “Carbon sequestration: an underexploited
environmental benefit of agroforestry systems.” Agroforestry Systems 61: 285-295.
Mundell, M. 2002. “The Economic Impacts of the CRP & CREP Programs in the Long
Branch Watershed.” Report S-2002-02. The Community Policy Analysis Center
(CPAC). University of Missouri Columbia.
Muradian, R., E. Corbera, U. Pascual, N. Kosoy, and P.H. May. 2010. “Reconciling
theory and practice: an alternative conceptual framework for understanding
payments for environmental services.” Ecological Economics 69: 1202-1208.
Narain, U., S. Gupta, and K. Van’t Veld. 2008. “Poverty and the environment: exploring
the relationship between household incomes, private assets, and natural
assets.” Land Economics 84 (1): 148-167.
Narloch, U., U. Pascual, and A.G. Drucker. 2011. “Cost-effectiveness targeting under
multiple conservation goals and equity considerations in the Andes.”
Environmental Conservation 38 (4): 417-425.
Nielsen, M.R., M. Pouliot, and R.K. Bakkegaard. 2012. “Combining income and assets
measures to include the transitory nature of poverty in assessments of forest
dependence: Evidence from the Democratic Republic of Congo.” Ecological
Economics 78: 37-46.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). 2016., Daily Surface Weather and
Climatological Summaries (Daymet) weather dataset. Available at:
http://daymet.ornl.gov/singlepixel.html
90

Pascual, U., J. Phelps, E. Garmendia, K. Brown, E. Corbera, A. Martin, E. GomezBaggethun, and R. Muradian. 2014. “Social equity matters in payments for
ecosystem services.” Bioscience 64 (11): 1027-1036.
Pascual, U., R. Muradian, L.C. Rodriguez, and A. Duraiappah. 2009. “Revisiting the
relationship between equity and efficiency in payments for environmental
services.” Working Paper Series, 1, Ecosystem Services Economics (ESE).
Pascual, U., R. Muradian, L.C. Rodríguez, and A. Duraiappah. 2010. “Exploring the links
between equity and efficiency in payments for environmental services: A
conceptual approach.” Ecological Economics 69 (6): 1237-1244.
Pascual, U., J. Phelps, E. Garmendia, K. Brown, E. Corbera, A. Martin, E. GomezBaggethun, and R. Muradian. 2014. “Social equity matters in payments for
ecosystem services.” Bioscience 64 (11): 1027-1036.
Partridge, M.D., and D.S. Rickman. 2005. “High-poverty nonmetropolitan counties in
America: Can economic development help?” International Regional Science
Review 28 (4): 415-440.
Polasky, S., D.J. Lewis, A.J. Plantinga, and E. Nelson. 2014. “Implementing the optimal
provision of ecosystem services.” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 111 (17): 6248-6253.
Reddy, S.R.C., and S.P. Chakravarty. 1999. “Forest dependence and income distribution
in a subsistence economy: evidence from India.” World development 27 (7):
1141-1149.
Remler, D.K., S.D. Korenman, and R.T. Hyson. 2017. “Estimating the Effects of Health
Insurance and Other Social Programs on Poverty Under the Affordable Care
91

Act.” Health Affairs 36 (10): 1828-1837.
Richards, K.R., and C. Stokes. 2004. “A review of forest carbon sequestration cost
studies: a dozen years of research.” Climatic Change 63 (1-2): 1-48.
Ricketts, T., E. Dinerstein, D.M. Oldson, C. Loucks, W. Eichbaum, D.A. DellaSala, K.
Kavanagh, P. Hedao, P. Hurley, K. Carney, R. Abell, and S. Walters. 1999.
Terrestrial Ecoregions of North America: A Conservation Assessment. T.H
Ricketts, ed. New York: Island Press.
Rosen, H.S. 1985. Housing subsidies: “Effects on housing decisions, efficiency, and
equity.” In A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, eds. Handbook of Public
Economics Vol. 1, Elsevier, pp 375-420.
Santiago, A.M., G.C. Galster, and P. Tatian. 2001. “Assessing the Property Value Impacts
of the Dispersed Hounsing Subsidy Program in Denver.” Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management 20 (1): 65-88.
Schultz, T.P. 2004. “School subsidies for the poor: evaluating the Mexican Progresa
poverty program.” Journal of Development Economics 74 (1): 199-250.
Shehata, E., and S. Mickaiel. 2013. “SPREGSACXT: Stata module to Estimate Maximum
Likelihood Estimation Spatial Auto Correlation (SAC) Panel Regression.”
Statistical Software Components S457761, Boston College Department of
Economics.
Smeeding, T. 2006. “Poor people in rich nations: The United States in comparative
perspective.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(1): 69-90.
Smeeding, T.M., P. Saunders, J. Coder, S. Jenkins, J. Fritzell, A.J. Hagenaars, R.
Hauser, and M. Wolfson. 1993. Poverty, inequality, and family living standards
92

impacts across seven nations: “The effect of noncash subsidies for health,
education and housing.” Review of Income and Wealth 39 (3): 229-256.
Sohngen, B., and S. Brown. 2006. “The influence of conversion of forest types on carbon
sequestration and other ecosystem services in the South Central United
States.” Ecological Economics 57 (4): 698-708.
Timber Mart-South (TMS). 2006, 2011. Product and Services. Available at:
http://www.timbermart-south.com./products.html
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1990. Data bases, tables, and calculators by subject:
Employment. Available at: http://www.bls.gov/data/#employment
U.S. Census Bureau. 2000. Census 2000 Gateway.
Available at: https://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html
U.S. Census Bureau. 2010. Data tools.
Available at: https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennialcensus/data/tools.html
U.S. Census Bureau. 2017a. Poverty: How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty.
Available at: https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/poverty/guidance/
poverty-measures.html
U.S. Census Bureau. 2017b. Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE)
Program. Available at: https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/saipe/saipe.html?
s_appName=saipe&map_yearSelector=2016&map_geoSelector=aa_c
U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service. 2017. FIA Data and Tools.
Available at: https://www.fia.fs.fed.us/tools-data/index.php
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). 2013. Data and Tools.
93

Available at: https://www.usgs.gov/products/data-and-tools/gis-data
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). 2016. Multi-Resolution Land Characteristics
Consortium(MRLC): National Land Cover Database (NLCD).
Available at: http://www.mrlc.gov/finddata.php
Wu, J., and J. Yu. 2017. “Efficiency-Equity Tradeoffs in Targeting Payments for
Ecosystem Services.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 99 (4): 894913.
Zhang, W., and S. Pagiola. 2011. “Assessing the potential for synergies in the
implementation of payments for environmental services programmes: an empirical
analysis of Costa Rica.” Environmental Conservation 38 (4): 406-416.
Zilberman, D., L. Lipper, and N. McCarthy. 2008. “When could payments for
environmental services benefit the poor?” Environment and Development
Economics 13 (3): 255-278.

94

Appendix
Table 3.1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for the land-use model
Variables
Definition
Mean
(Std Dev)
Dependent variables
Share of forest area
Ratio of forested area to non-forested area
3.489
relative to non-forest area in years, 1992, 2001, and 2011
(8.679)
Socioeconomic variables
Forest return
Annual forest return in years 1992, 2001,
53.778
and 2011 ($/hectare)
(18.485)
Average return of
Annual weighted average return of non333.052
non-forested land
forested land, with land shares as weights
(507.480)
(i.e., crop, pasture, and urban) in years,
1992, 2001, and 2011 ($/hectare)
Geophysical variables
Average elevation
Average elevation (meter)
446.756
(204.931)
Average slope
Average slope (degree)
2.156
(1.148)
Appalachian forest
1 if county is in Central Appalachian Forest
0.336
ecoregion
Ecoregion, 0 otherwise
(0.472)
Cumberlands and
1 if county is in Cumberlands and Southern
0.480
southern ridge and valley Ridge and Valley Ecoregion, 0 otherwise
(0.499)
ecoregion
Year variable
Year 1992
1 if year is 1992, 0 otherwise
0.333
dummy variable
(0.471)
Year 2001
1 if year is 2001, 0 otherwise
0.333
dummy variable
(0.471)
Note: All variables are at the county level.
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Table 3.2. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for the poverty alleviation
model
Variables

Definition

Poverty variable
Poverty rate
mitigation

Poverty rate at the end of the period minus
poverty rate at the beginning of the period
(i.e., 1992-2001 and 2001-2011)
Socioeconomic variables (at the beginning of the period, 1992 and 2001)
Forest return
Annual forest return ($/hectare)
Average return of
non-forested land

Annual weighted average return of non-forested
land (i.e., crop, pasture, and urban) with land shares
as weights ($/hectare)
Demographic variable (at the beginning of the period, 1992 and 2001)
White
White population divided by total population (%)
Asia-Pacific

Asia-Pacific population divided by total
population (%)
Other races
Native Americans and other races excluding white,
Asian-Pacific, and Black population divided by total
population (%)
Age under
Population aged below 18 years divided by total
17 years
population (%)
Age between
Population aged between 18 and 24 divided by
18 - 24 years
total population (%)
Age over
Population aged 65 or older divided by total
65 years
population (%)
English
Population aged between 16 and 64 with
Speaking
difficulty speaking English divided by total
population (%)
Female-headed
Population living in female-headed households
household
divided by total population (%)
Some college
Population with at least some college education
education
divided by total population aged 25 or older (%)
Two or more
Population living in households with two or more
workers
workers divided by total population (%)
Employment variable (at the beginning of the period, 1992 and 2001)
Agriculture
Employment in agriculture, forestry,
fishing, hunting, and mining divided by total
employment (%)
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Mean
(Std Dev)
0.471
(4.656)

57.955
(20.236)
28.823
(407.503)

94.184
(6.395)
0.411
(0.561)
2.034
(3.211)
23.822
(2.649)
21.516
(11.567)
14.335
(2.906)
3.219
(2.323)
24.361
(3.439)
31.185
(10.493)
18.574
(3.355)
3.301
(6.602)

Table 3.2. Continued
Variables
Manufacture
Public
Finance
Leisure

Definition

Employment in manufacturing and
construction divided by total employment (%)
Employment in transportation, warehousing, and other
public utilities divided by total employment (%)
Employment in Finance, insurance, real estate, rental,
and leasing divided by total employment (%)
Employment in arts, entertainment, recreation,
accommodation, and food services divided by total
employment (%)

Year variable
Period dummy 1 if year is 1992, 0 otherwise
variable
Note: All variables are at the county level.
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Mean
(Std Dev)
6.120
(14.623)
8.571
(9.988)
3.237
(1.637)
7.987
(4.820)

0.500
(0.500)

Table 3.3. Parameter estimates of the land-use model from the spatial panel model with
IV
Variables

Coefficient
(Std Dev)

Socioeconomic variables
Forest return
Average return of non-forested land (× 0.1)
Geophysical variables
Average elevation (× 0.1)
Average slope
Appalachian forest ecoregion
Cumberlands and southern ridge and valley
ecoregion
Year variable
Year 1992 dummy variable
Year 2001 dummy variable
Spatial dependence variable
Spatial lag

0.030*
(0.015)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.003*
(0.001)
0.172*
(0.053)
-0.476*
(0.130)
-0.069
(0.158)
0.160*
(0.069)
-0.667*
(0.372)

-0.263
(0.306)
Spatial error
0.333
(0.244)
Note: Adjusted R2 = 0.526, Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and * denotes
significance at the 5% level.

98

Table 3.4. Parameter estimates of the poverty alleviation model from the spatial panel
model without IV
Variables
Coefficient
(Std Dev)
Socioeconomic variables
Forest return
-0.016*
(0.008)
-0.007
Average return of non-forested land (× 0.01)
(0.032)
Demographic variable
White
0.005
(0.027)
Asia-Pacific
0.186
(0.375)
Other races
0.042
(0.064)
Age under 17 years
-0.052
(0.090)
Age between 18 - 24 years
0.124*
(0.056)
Age over 65 years
-0.024
(0.085)
English Speaking
0.052
(0.120)
Female-headed householder
0.099
(0.052)
Some college education
-0.005
(0.023)
Two or more workers
-0.205*
(0.085)
Agriculture
-0.016
(0.029)
Manufacture
0.055*
(0.015)
Public
-0.068
(0.041)
Finance
0.060
(0.083)
Leisure
0.019
(0.030)
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Table 3.4. Continued
Variables

Coefficient
(Std Dev)

Year variable
Period dummy variable

-2.631*
(1.242)

Spatial dependence variable
Spatial lag

0.004
(0.102)
Spatial error
0.041
(0.157)
Note: Adjusted R2 = 0.773, Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and * denotes
significance at the 5% level.
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Table 3.5. Carbon cost, poverty alleviation, and economic impact cost efficiencies under four priority scenarios by quartile of
the optimal allocated budget distributions
Scenarios

I

II

III

IV

Quartiles
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

Optimal budget
distribution
($)
19,218 – 737,116
3,953 – 19,217
1,710 – 3,952
1 – 1,709
15,211 – 737,719
5,384 – 15,210
2,149 – 5,383
1 – 2,148
16,695 – 737,119
6,374 – 16,694
2,176 – 6,373
1 – 2,175
16,888 – 737,119
6,551 – 16,887
2,198 – 6,550
1 - 2197

Optimal
carbon storage
(tonne)
190,710.68
16,600.83
4,189.46
1,179.44
180,321.51
19,736.73
5,139.84
1,617.06
177,065.79
16,859.71
7,198.08
1,634.38
171,916.51
21,371.71
6,138.97
1,740.69

Carbon
Total poverty Poverty alleviation
cost efficiency
alleviation
efficiency
(tonne/$)
(population)
(population/$)
0.047
0.042
0.035
0.033
0.046
2,157
0.044
0.036
135
0.023
0.033
237
0.106
0.034
25
0.024
0.047
0.040
0.033
0.034
0.046
2,553
0.010
0.037
169
0.003
0.033
228
0.012
0.035
18
0.003

Total
Economic
impact ($)
10,634,567
970,578
497,349
103,358
10,294,469
1,303,491
436,486
107,645

Economic
Impact efficiency
($/$)
0.050
0.050
0.037
0.042
0.046
0.039
0.044
0.041

Note: I, II, III, and IV are single objective of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (100%
weight), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (50%) and alleviating
maximum poverty for promoting equity (50%), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost
efficiency (50%) and promoting economic impact for economic development (50%), and triple objectives of maximizing
forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (33%), alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity (33%),
and promoting economic impact for economic development (33%), respectively.

101

Table 3.6. Total carbon storage, poverty alleviation, and economic impact under a
hypothetical budget of $5 million (50% of budget needed to reach maximum carbon
storage capacity) with four weight scenarios
Scenarios

Carbon storage
Poverty alleviation
Economic impact
(tonne)
(population)
($)
I
212,681
2,326
12,055,671
II
206,815
2,554
12,182,638
III
202,758
2,993
12,205,852
IV
201,171
2,970
12,142,209
Note: I, II, III, and IV are single objective of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for
improving cost efficiency ($100% weight), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based
carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (50%) and alleviating maximum poverty for
promoting equity (50%), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for
improving cost efficiency (50%) and promoting economic impact for economic
development (50%), and triple objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for
improving cost efficiency (33%), alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity
(33%), and promoting economic impact for economic development (33%), respectively.
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Figure 3.1. Overview of case study area
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3.2.-a
Scenario I

3.2.-b
Scenario II

3.2.-c
Scenario III

3.2.-d
Scenario IV

Figure 3.2. Optimal spatial distribution of payment budget scenario focusing on single, dual, and triple objectives (I, II, III,
and IV)
Note: I, II, III, and IV are single objective of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (100%
weight), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (50%) and alleviating
maximum poverty for promoting equity (50%), dual objectives of maximizing forest-based carbon storage for improving cost
efficiency (50%) and promoting economic impact for economic development (50%), and triple objectives of maximizing
forest-based carbon storage for improving cost efficiency (33%), alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity (33%),
and promoting economic impact for economic development (33%), respectively.
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Chapter 4: Summary
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The two essays examine the optimal spatial targeting of PES under several
objectives. Through MOLP in the first essay, we identify optimal county-level targets
with a total conservation budget optimally distributed under 27 alternatives, nine
weighting scenarios involving the two core objectives multiplied by three budget
scenarios and identify resulting changes in forest carbon and estimate economic impacts.
We then develop three tradeoff frontiers between the two objectives that are created from
the targeted PES for the three budget scenarios. Along each frontier, PES is Pareto
optimal since forest carbon storage cannot be increased without sacrificing economic
impacts and vice versa. In the second essay, we implement the case study by using
MOLP based on three objective functions: (i) maximizing forest-based carbon storage for
improving cost efficiency, (ii) alleviating maximum poverty for promoting equity, and
(iii) promoting economic impact for economic development. By comparing the optimal
solutions under the multiple weighting scenarios, we evaluate trade-off and synergistic
relationships among the objectives.
In the empirical result from the first essay, maps of PES optimal budget
distributions among counties, given different weighting scenarios, provide evidence that,
the greater the weight assigned to maximizing forest carbon benefits relative to
maximizing economic impacts, the more widespread the optimal budget is allocated
among the counties. This finding occurs since the economic-impact objective is more
dominant in the targeting decision than the carbon-cost efficiency objective, on average.
Also, along a given Pareto optimal frontier (i.e., a given PES total budget), (1) an
increase in the weight assigned to economic impacts with a corresponding decrease in the
weight assigned to forest carbon benefits increases economic impacts while reducing
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forest carbon benefits and vice versa, and (2) the increase in economic impacts is
relatively higher than the sacrifice in forest carbon benefits when the initial weight
assigned to economic impacts is relatively lower than the initial weight assigned to forest
carbon benefits and vice versa. Because of the concavity of the Pareto optimal
relationship, assigning greater weight to an objective, which is of minimal concern at the
initial policy-making stage, makes sense if conservation agencies add that objective to a
multiple-objective targeting framework. The concavity of the Pareto optimal relationship
can be explained by the law of increasing opportunity cost, implying that as an increase
in the weight assigned to economic impacts (or forest carbon benefits) rises, the
opportunity cost of economic growth (or forest carbon benefits) increases.
Considering additional poverty alleviation as social equity in the second essay, the
relationships among the objectives are quantified by aggregating and comparing the three
objective values under the four priority scenarios. The quantified relationships reveal that
different priority weights among the priority scenarios yield both competitive trade-offs
and synergistic relationships between the objectives. Changing the priority weights from
100% on carbon cost efficiency to weights of 50% on carbon cost efficiency and 50% on
poverty alleviation efficiency or 50% on carbon cost efficiency and 50% on economic
impact demonstrates competitive trade-off between the objective of carbon cost
efficiency and the objectives of poverty alleviation and economic impact, and a
synergistic relationship between poverty alleviation and economic impact. We believe the
synergic relationship likely occurs because higher poverty alleviation efficiency and
higher economic impact efficiency tend to occur in the same counties. The optimal spatial
budget distributions under different priority scenarios can be used to spatially target PES
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budgets to encourage forest-based carbon storage, or other conservation goals, while also
promoting social equity through poverty alleviation and rural economic development
through increased economic activity. Further, the quantified trade-off and synergistic
relationships among the multi objectives can be used by conservation agencies to assess
the costs (trade-offs) or benefits (synergies) of the priorities they place on the objectives.
Thus, our modeling framework can help conservation agencies adjust their priorities to
address other objectives when they view the cost of achieving a single conservation too
high in terms of other objectives sacrificed.
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Appendix: Supplemental Material
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S.1. Expected annual return per hectare of four land uses
The expected annual return per hectare of forestland (i.e., deciduous forestland
and evergreen forestland) was estimated using Soil Expectation Value (SEV), which
represents the present discounted value of the rents earned by an infinite series of
identical rotations with the same timber management activities (Bettinger et al. 2009).
The SEV for forestland f (f = deciduous forestland or evergreen forestland) per hectare
for county j in 2001, for example, was estimated as:
SEV fjt =

Pf ⋅ Q fjt
(1 + r )t − 1

,

where Pf is the stumpage price for forestland f in 2001, Q fjt is the harvest volume per
hectare for forestland f in county j at harvest age t, and r is the discount rate of 5%. Here,
the stumpage price is the price received by the landholder for the forest products after all
costs of cutting, snigging and haulage have been paid. Following the conventional
timber-harvesting decision rule, the harvest age t was determined by setting the average
stumpage value equal to the annual incremental change in stumpage value for forestland
in county j. Then, Q fjt was obtained by taking the average of the plot-level harvest
volume per hectare for county j based on the Forest Inventory and Analysis (FIA)
database (USDA Forest Service 2015).
The stumpage price for Tennessee was obtained from Timber Mart-South (2015),
which is a quarterly market price survey report of the major timber products. The
stumpage price for Kentucky was collected from Growing Gold (Kentucky Division of
Forestry 2015). The information on harvest volume and rotation age at the county-level
for deciduous forestland and evergreen forestland was from Smith et al. (2006).
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Weighted averages in 2001 and 2006 of the SEVs for a county were calculated
with the shares of the two forestland types in the county as weights. Then, the annualized
weighted-average SEV per hectare for the county was calculated for each year. The SEV
is annualized for the following reason: Forestland provides non-annual periodic income
based on the timber harvest cycle and expected returns from the other three land uses are
estimated as annual values. The expected returns from the four land uses must be in the
same unit (i.e., annual US $ per hectare) because they are included as regressors for
competing land uses in the multinomial logit model.
Weighted averages of the SEVs for each county j for year t (t = 2001 and 2006),
WSEVjt, were calculated based on shares of the two forestland types as:
WSEV
=
jt

2

∑w
f =1

f

⋅ SEV fjt .

where w f is the ratio of each tree type in the county and SEV fjt is the SEV for forestland
type f in county j for year t. Then, the annualized weighted-average SEV per hectare (

AWSEV jt ) for each forestland type in each county in year t was calculated as:
AWSEV jt = WSEV jt

 1 − (1/ (1 + i ) n )  


,


r



where r is the discount rate and n represent a period of 100 years, which can be flexible,
but should be adequately long. Then, the property tax amounts, which vary by county,
were subtracted from AWSEV to estimate the expected annual return per hectare of
forestland after tax.
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County-level rent per hectare of pastureland was used as the expected net return
per hectare of pastureland. County-level data for 2001 and 2006 were not available. The
data were predicted using a fixed-effect model with panel data by regressing county-level
pastureland rent on state-level pastureland rent and county-level cattle numbers and
pastureland area for the period of 2008–2012. The latter variables were included under
the premise that pastureland rent is positively related with the size of the cattle herd and
the area of pastureland within a county. The pastureland rent data were from National
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS 2014) and cattle number data were from Census of
Agriculture (USDA Census of Agriculture 2012). County-level pastureland area is
available for 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012 for both states from the Census of Agriculture
(USDA Census of Agriculture 2012). The area data for unavailable years (i.e., 2008,
2009, 2010, and 2011) were interpolated assuming an annual average linear increase
between 1997 and 2012 for the estimation of the fixed effect model and its prediction of
2001 and 2006 county-level rent per hectare of pastureland. Then, the property tax
amounts were subtracted from the predicted values for 2001 and 2006 to estimate the
expected annual net returns per hectare of pastureland after property tax.
A description of the steps used to estimate the expected annual return per hectare
of cropland at the county level follows:
1. The ratio of livestock and poultry cash expenses to total farm production expenses
was derived;
2. This ratio was multiplied by total county net cash farm income to give an estimate
of net cash farm income from livestock and poultry. (Thus, net cash farm income
is directly and positively correlated with farm production expenses.);
112

3. The estimated net cash farm income from livestock and poultry was subtracted
from total net cash farm income, resulting in an estimate of net cash farm income
from cropland;
4. County-level net cash farm income from cropland was divided by hectares of
harvested cropland in the county; and
5. Property taxes per hectare were subtracted from net cash income from cropland
per hectare for 2001 and 2006 to estimate the expected annual return per hectare
of cropland after tax.
A description of the steps used to estimate the expected annual return per hectare
of urban land at the county level follows:
1. Parcel-level land value ratios were obtained for counties for which parcel-level
data were available by dividing assessed land value by total assessed value;
2.

The parcels’ land value ratios were divided by their respective plot sizes to
obtain land value ratios per hectare;

3.

An OLS regression was performed with the land value ratio per hectare as the
dependent variable and population density in 2010 and a vector of distance
variables as explanatory variables. The regression model was specified under the
premise that (i) the value of a parcel’s land increases relative to the value of its
single-family house in more urbanized areas that are more densely populated and
closer to the city center with its associated facilities (Albouy and Ehrlich 2012)
and (ii) the land value ratio does not fluctuate over time (Bourassa et al. 2011);

4.

The regression coefficients and the respective census-block group data were used
to estimate the average land value ratio per hectare for each census-block group;
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5.

The average land value ratio per hectare for each census-block group was
multiplied by the respective median housing price to obtain an estimate of the
median assessed land value per hectare, which was used as a proxy for the
expected return per hectare of urban land for each census-block group; and

The estimates were annualized assuming 100 years and a 5% discount rate and the
property tax amounts were subtracted from the annualized value to estimate the expected
annual return per hectare for urban land after the tax.
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S.2. Endogeneity tests for the land use and poverty alleviation models.
Instrument
Variables
(IV)
Land
use
model

Natural
amenity
index,
Urban
influence
index
Instrument
Variables
(IV)

Poverty
alleviation
model

UnderWeakOverEndogenous
Identification Identification Identification
Test
(Kleibergen(Stock(P-value)
(P-value)
Paap rk LM Wright LM S
statistic)
statistic)
4.065*
14.870*
0.04

UnderWeakOverEndogenous
Identification Identification Identification
Test
(P-value)
(Kleibergen(Stock(P-value)
Paap rk LM Wright LM S
statistic)
statistic)
6.273*
11.400*
0.252
0.06

Slope,
Elevation,
Natural
amenity
index
Note: *Denotes significance at 5% level

115

S.3. Parameter estimates of the 1st stage land-use model
Variables
Coefficient
Forest return
Geophysical variables
Average elevation
Average slope
Appalachian forest
ecoregion
Cumberlands and southern
ridge and valley ecoregion
Year variable
Year 1992 dummy variable
Year 2001 dummy variable
Instrument variable
Urban influence code

Coefficient
Average return of
Non-forested land

-0.010*
(0.003)
1.363*
(0.552)
-6.601*
(1.761)
1.748
(1.790)

0.283*
(0.114)
-166.448*
(17.868)
-161.723*
(56.948)
-445.190*
(57.877)

0.457
(1.185)
-24.019*
(1.182)

-11.528
(38.335)
16.211
(38.234)

0.674*
-34.832*
(0.170)
(5.500)
Natural amenity scale
-3.185*
-5.507
(0.943)
(30.498)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and * denotes significance at the 5%
level.
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S.4. Goodness-of-fit and marginal effect results for the land-use and poverty alleviation
models
Land use model
Poverty alleviation model
W matrices Log-likelihood Marginal Effect Log-likelihood Marginal Effect
Ratio
Ratio
K nearest neighbor (KNN)
K=4
-651.970
0.030(0.014)*
-616.441
-0.016(0.008)*
K=5
-651.864
0.029(0.014)*
-616.625
-0.016(0.008)*
K=9
-650.665
0.028(0.014)
-616.681
-0.016(0.008)*
K = 27
-652.339
0.028(0.015)
-616.154
-0.015(0.008)
KNN * Inverse distance
K=4
-651.325
0.030(0.015)*
-607.863
-0.018(0.007)*
K=5
-651.398
0.031(0.015)*
-611.761
-0.021(0.008)*
K=9
-652.187
0.030(0.015)*
-613.181
-0.021(0.008)*
K = 27
-652.998
0.030(0.015)*
-613.843
-0.020(0.008)*
Inverse
-653.220
0.030(0.015)*
-616.273
-0.018(0.008)*
Distance
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and * denotes significance at the 5% level
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Carbon

Poverty

Economic impact

S.5. Spatial distribution of annual average carbon cost, poverty alleviation, and economic impact cost efficiencies during the
2001-2011 period
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